Page 75 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment
P. 75

75
            InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed


            failed to destroy it. Further missions by ground attack planes were not carried out
            owing to the possibility of causing civilian casualties and the leaflet missions were
                            76
            cancelled as well.
               Due to the abandonment of the initial timetable, there was no concentrated air
            effort  against  the  Egyptian Army  installations. They  were  subjected  to  bombing
            from 2 November. Large targets, such as Huckstep Camp and Almaza Barracks,
            were subjected to aerial attacks. In addition, the air campaign included an extensive
            number of battlefield interdiction sorties aimed at preventing reinforcements from
                                                           77
            reaching Port Said from the morning of 3 November.
               On 4 November, the air effort was redirected because the landing sequence had
            been altered. According to the Air Task Force’s overall plan, most of the attack sorties
            were directed against the defences of Port Said.  Most of the sorties near Port Said
                                                      78
            were flown by naval aircraft that strafed the coastal and anti-aircraft positions and
            other static defences throughout the day. The land-based ground attack planes were
            still used for interdiction.  The bomber force, the role of which diminished after the
                                   79
            Egyptian Air Force was destroyed, made to raids against Huckstep Barracks and as
            a diversion against coastal defences near Alexandria.
                                                           80
              PERIOD                  PROPORTION OF TOTAL EFFORT
                         Airfields  Barracks      Armed        Defences      Others
                                              Reconnaissance
               Day 1       96%         -             -             -          4%

               Day 2       68%       25%             -             -          7%
               Day 3       34%       16%           33%             -         17%
               Day 4       22%        8%           8%            39%         22%
               Day 5       19%       15%           15%           47%         10%

               Day 6       11%         -           25%           60%          4%
               Table 3: Allocation of air effort against different target categories


            76
                See Brian Cull with David Nicolle and Shlomo Aloni, Wings Over Suez, pp. 237-239. For a descrip-
               tion of the raid from the time, see NA AIR 20/9967, Bomber Wing Cyprus, “Report on Operation
               Musketeer, annex D”, 30 December 1956.
            77
                NA AIR 14/4030, Admiralty, Department of Operational Research, August 1957, Report No.34:
               “Carrier Operations in Support of Operation Musketeer” and Brian Cull with David Nicolle and
               Shlomo Aloni, Wings Over Suez, pp. 248-262.
            78   NA AIR 20/10206, Air Task Force Headquarters, 3 November 1956, “Operation Telescope, Overall
               Air Plan”.
            79   ADM 116/6104, Office of the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers, 14 December 1956, “Operation Mus-
               keteer – Reports of Proceedings – Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers”, pp. 23-24.
            80
                NA AIR 14/4441, Bomber Command, Operational Research Branch, Report number 355: “Bombing
               and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer”.
   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80