Page 77 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

minimise civilian casualties and the rather small amount of aircraft put the Bomber
Command into a totally different situation than what it had faced during the massive
areal bombings of the Second World War. On the other hand, the bomber operations,
as well as the overall nature of the warfare, were in a transition phase. The role
of nuclear weapons and the future of conventional bomber operations were in the
melting pot both technically and doctrinally. Air Marshall Slessor, the Chief of Air
Staff at the time when the Royal Air Force War Manual was produced, warned in his
introductory note that the new technology, including nuclear weapons “may radically
change the face of war in a way that no one can now forecast with any assurance”.
The failure of bombing operations was rectified by a very traditional employment
of tactical air forces. In spite of the unsuccessful bomber employment, the Egyptian
Air Force was annihilated in two days, the parachute landing was carried out and
supported successfully and no large-scale Egyptian reinforcement arrived at Port
Said to prevent or even hamper the landings. But in the end it did not matter. Unsound
strategy can seldom be mended by sound tactics.