Page 74 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

74 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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The Air Campaign that did not Take Place
The formal decision to launch Operation Musketeer took place on 25 October
1956. The decision to use force, had, however, been decided earlier – probably
on 14 October when a high level French delegation paid a visit to Prime Minister
Eden. Things began to happen rapidly after the visit. On 18 October the Air Ministry
ordered execution of Operation Challenger, the re-deployment of Bomber Command
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squadrons to the Middle East (Malta and Cyprus). On the next day, the French
commenced the loading of transport vessels in Algiers and Marseille and the French
fighter squadrons flew from Metropolitan France to Cyprus on 22 October. 70
The Royal Air Force finished the deployment of its bomber squadrons to
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Malta and Cyprus by 30 October. The first phase of air operations began on the
evening of 31 October and continued for two days. The results of night bombing
were ineffective. According to the report by the Operational Research Branch of
the Bomber Command, there was a lot to improve especially in the high level night
bombing techniques: “The bombing accuracy of the Valiant was about 1,000 yards,
Malta Canberras 800 yards and the Cyprus Canberras 500 yards.” The low-lever
attacks in daylight, however, annihilated the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force during
the first two days as planned. 72
The next phase of the plan was cancelled before it was put into a practice. The
Egypt Committee decided against the destruction of the Egyptian oil installations
because repercussions in other Arab countries could damage the United Kingdom’s
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own oil interests. According to the instructions, the bombing campaign should
concentrate only on military targets.
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The hectic timetable and the decision to abandon the destruction of the Egyptian
oil installations dropped the bottom from the psychological operations. Not even
Radio Cairo was silenced at the first phase of the operation despite General Keightley
having placed this radio station on the list of targets that were to be attacked first.
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The attack took place only on 2 November, but a raid by twenty Canberra-bombers

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AIR 20/10203 Air Ministry to Bomber Command, 2445/ACAS (ops)/TS/Oct 18 1956, “Operation
Challenger”.
70
SHD 8 S 274, Etat-Major des Forces Armeés, 1618/EMFA/3. B.T.M.A/12 Avril 1957, “Les Trans-
ports de L’operation 700 » and Imperial War Museum, 96/10/1, papers of Air Chief Marshal Denis
Barnett, Groupement Mixte No 1, 320/GM1/OPS/TS/27 Novembre 1956, “Rapport du General De
Brigade Aerienne Brohon sur la Creation, L’ installation et L’activite du Groupment Mixte No 1 a
Chypre”.
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AIR 8/2090, A note by Wing Commander Hughes, 12 Nov 1956, “Deployment of Bomber Forces to
the Middle East”.
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NA AIR 14/4441, Bomber Command, Operational Research Branch, Report number 355: “Bombing
and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer” and AIR 8/2111, Air Ministry, D.D.
(Ops), TS 301/III, 17 February 1957, “Operation Musketeer”.
73 th
NA CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 37 Meeting, 1 November 1956.
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NA AIR 8/1940, COSKEY 20, 2 November 1956.
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Papers of General Sir Charles Keightley, Transcripts: rear link communications Episkopi-London.