Page 71 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

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information. The far end of the criticism was provided by Douglas Dodds-Parker,
the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Psychological Warfare. According to
his testimony, the committee was not able to produce anything useful due to the
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lack of intelligence. The evidence points to secrecy taken to the extremes which
hampered both political and military preparations. The defection of Guy Burgess
and Donald McLean that shook the whole British intelligence community was still
in fresh memory. According to Scott Lucas, perhaps the most renown researcher
of the Suez intelligence affairs, the situation was even more grim: MI6 was not
under adequate control of the Foreign Office and pursued its own policies. The claim
by Lucas might be exaggerated even though ever since the Suez Crisis we have
seen several examples of the manipulation of information to serve one’s political
ambitions.

Targeting

The over-optimistic concept of winning the war through bombing begun to
deteriorate as soon as it was accepted. The Task Force Commanders were not
convinced, not even the Air Task Force Commander, of the probable outcome. As
a result, the amphibious assault was re-attached to the plan. It included two options
that were dependent on the results of air offensive. If the bombing proved to break
the Egyptian resistance, the Canal Zone was to be occupied by rapidly deployable
airborne forces and an occupation force taking advantage of fast sealift. If the
Egyptians, however, continued fighting in spite of severe bombing, a traditional
amphibious assault would be launched at Port Said.
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The air plan was divided into three phases which were in harmony with the overall
concept:
1. Neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force.
2. “Attack of objectives which – in combination of psychological warfare – will
lead to the collapse of the Egyptian will to resist”.
3. Support of land and naval operations leading to the occupation of the Canal
Zone. 59
The neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force was to take minimum time – two
days. Airfields housing IL-28 light bombers were to be primary targets due to their

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TNA ADM 116/6209, “Naval Report on Operations Musketeer”, 15 February 1956 and WO 288/78,
“2 Corps Commander’s Report”, Annex 1, 1 February 1956.
57
Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Archives, Suez Oral History Project, SUEZOHP 6, interview of Sir
Douglas Dodds-Parker.
58
NA ADM 205/132, “Operation Musketeer Revise – Appreciation and Outline Plan” by the Task
Force Commanders, 14 September 1956.
59
TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, “Report on Operation Musket-
eer”.