Page 67 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

concentrated along the Desert Road leading to Cairo relatively quickly. A good port
would be needed to carry out the vast maintenance plan for some 77,000 men and
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11,000 vehicles. The political advantage, of course, was that Alexandria offered
an option to strike directly into the seat of Nasser’s power. According to the British
calculations, the Egyptians would defend their capital. By luring them into fighting
a repetition of the battle of the Pyramids, the main elements of the Egyptian army
could be annihilated.
The concept was refined into a plan by the end of August – the preliminary D-Day
being in mid-September. The plan – that can be characterised as safe and traditional,
yet in full harmony with existing amphibious doctrine – included five subsequent
phases: movements, rapid neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force, amphibious and
airborne assaults to gain a bridgehead, consolidation of the bridgehead and finally
operations towards Cairo.
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The British were acquainted with the Egyptian base system – they were of course,
constructed earlier by the British. The Egyptian Air Force was estimated to consist
of some 300 combat planes including some 80 Mig-15 fighters and 45 IL-28 light
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bombers, most others being more or less obsolete types. According to intelligence
estimates, the Egyptians were still in a transition phase with their new equipment and
not able to operate them efficiently until the end of 1956. Even after that operations
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would be hampered because of a primitive ground control system.
Air Marshall Barnett estimated that it would take between 2-3 days to neutralise
the Egyptian Air Force. Although the idea of a single surprise air attack just prior to
the landings was considered amongst some planners, it was found not practicable.
There were not enough planes to destroy the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and to
execute and support airborne landings simultaneously. Due to the lack of an original
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overall air plan for the Alexandria option, the details of consequent air operations
can only be guessed. Presumably, they were directed to support the assault forces, to
isolate the battle area and to destroy Egyptian military targets in depth in accordance
with the doctrine.
For the active operations, the Allied order of battle included over 500 aircraft.
The number of planes fluctuated during the tedious planning process but the

39 NA WO 32/16320, War Office, QM (3), 17 August 1956, ”Maintenance Plan for Operation Musket-
eer” and SHD 8 S 274, Etat-Major des Forces Armeés, 1618/EMFA/3. B.T.M.A/12 Avril 1957, “Les
Transports de L’operation 700”.
40
NA WO 288/91, HQ Allied Task Force, 29 August 1956, “Allied Land Force Operation Order No 1”.
41
NA AIR 20/9554, HQ Air Task Force, ATF/TS.175/56, October 1956, “Overall Air Plan (Winter) for
Operation Musketeer”.
42
NA CAB 158/24, JIC (56) 33, 28 February 1956, “Egyptian Effectiveness in the Use of Soviet Air-
craft”.
43
Imperial War Museum, Department of Books and Documents, Papers of Air Chief Marshall Sir
Denis Barnett (96/10/1), Barnett to the COS-Committee, 9 August 1956 and NA AIR 20/9961,
Squadron Leader Penred to Senior Air Staff Officer, AHQL 612/TS/Plans, 17 August 1956.