Page 65 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

demand to establish Royal Air Force air bases in the bridgehead as soon as the general
situation permitted because direct support from the carries for a prolonged period
was not economic use of force. The power of carriers lay in their manoeuvrability.
As a result, the responsibility for supporting any subsequent land operations was
generally allocated to the Royal Air Force squadrons. The use of air power in a
ground campaign did not alter the basic requirements for an air offensive. The
strategic bombing campaign would still be directed against targets that yielded
long-term effects, as described earlier in this chapter. The use of bombers for direct
support was considered an inappropriate diversion of resources.
The deployment of lighter forces, such as ground attack planes, was also to be
directed against movement. This kind of operation, called interdiction as mentioned
earlier, would follow the principle of not deploying aircraft for tasks that could be
performed by artillery or armour. The firepower of aircraft should be directed at
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targets further from the frontline to cause long-term damage. The principal of
concentration of effort against movement was again based on empirical experience.
During the war, the British had used their ground attack planes for two types of
missions that were still carried out at the time of the Suez Crisis: close air support
and armed reconnaissance. Both types of missions were conducted during Operation
Musketeer.
Armed reconnaissance was a form of interdiction. Planes were given a specific
31
area well behind enemy limes where they were to attack any target of tactical value.
Close air support, in turn, was defined as “support given to the ground forces by air
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action against enemy troops actually engaged in the land battle.” The closest form
of close air support was called CabRank, which was a patrol of ground attack planes
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kept in the air and ready for use against targets specified by ground controllers.
Experience in the Second World War had proven that armed reconnaissance
was more effective than close air support when considering the number of enemy
casualties caused. This experience had also shown the value of artillery. If artillery
was available, it was usually more effective in destroying enemy positions than close
air support because the main weapon systems of the British ground attack planes
were rather unsophisticated unguided rockets or bombs. However, ground attack
planes in a close air support role often had a better effect on morale than artillery.
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30 Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, p. 55.
31
Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront. Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-1945, (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 198-199.
32
KA (The National Archives of Finland), T 26890/Hla 4, RAC Centre, Tactical Wing, 1956, Tactical
Note “Air Support”.
33
Notes from the Theatres of War, No. 20: Italy 1943/1944 (War Office, 1945), pp. 68-69 and Ian
Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, pp. XV and 2-3.
34
Gooderson, pp. 192-193.