Page 346 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

332 IGOR A. AMOSOV

screen made by 3-4 submarines. But che main task was to search position of Ame-
rican SSNG, which represented the most serious threat for the territory of the
Soviet U nion.
24JU.68 an official communication of TASS stated: "The Soviet U nion as
a Black Sea and consequently a Mediterranean state realizes its undeniable righe
of che presence in this regio n. Soviet naval shi ps are in the Mediterranean no t to
create a threat to any people or state. Their task is to render help to the cause of
stability and peace in the Mediterranean region".
And in fact opposing stands of the naval forces in che US and in the USSR
were a factor of deterrence in ali cases of aggravating situation. Though the Soviet
ships demonsrated support to ics allies- Arab countries in the East of the Mediter-
ranea n, and American actively supported rheir strategie ally in the region - Israel,
but the one and the orher side clearly understood inadmissibility of a serious con-
flict between forces of the rwo nuclear powers.
During the Arab - Israeli war of 1973 both Soviet and American formations
were strengrhened. And when there appeared necessity of rapid delivery of arma-
mene and military equipment for Syria a special group of Soviet ships was formed
in arder to assure security of Russian convoys. They had permission to open fire
on Israeli missile boars and planes in case of direct threat to transports. But luckily
such situation didn't happened, the Israelies did not try ro attack convoys.
In generai the activity of the MS allowed ro improve operational organisation
and methods of the Soviet Navy in actual oppositional activity of NATO' s forces,
to get practice of ractical cooperation of surface ships and submarines, ro creare
and improve the system of all kind of support to ships at sea.
Certainly, it is clear that combar strength of the Soviet Mediterranean squa-
dron was !esser then each of the naval forces of ltaly, Britain or France in the area.
So far as the American 6th Fleet was concerned the difference in power was much
greater. The three main task forces- strike, antisubmarine warfear and supply, two
aircraft carrier groups with about 80 planes · carriers of nuclear weapons, one an-
tisubmarine carrier group, cruisers, destroyers, amphibian force group with an ex-
pedirional battalion of marines and the main striking force - 12 - 14 aromic
submarines, half of them Polaris-rype. Since 1968 NATO formed a new command-
Maritime Air Forces Mediterranea n for coordinating aerial surveillence of the So-
viet fleet.
But nevertheless the Mediterranean squadron of che Soviet Navy was such part
of the Soviet sea power which all fleers of NATO an d ali Mediterranean countries
had to recon with. The main force of i t was concentrared in the eastern Mediterra-
nean in a favorable environment. Its surface ships, small craft, submarines were
armed with cruise missile of different type with range from 70 to 550 kilomerres,
some with nuclear warheads · the armament quite effective against surface ships,
but Americans in that period somehow neglected development of such weapons.
They had quite modern two-purpose antiair missiles. So the Mediterranean squa-
dron was an importane element of the security of the Soviet U nion.