Page 351 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

SOVIET STRATEGIC l'I<AVAL IKTERESTS AND ACfiVITIES 337

The George Washington, carrying 16 Polaris A-1 missiles, went on its first operatio-
nal patrol on November that year. In 1962, forty-one Polaris ballistic missiles sub-
marines had be authorized. The USSR preceded the US in developing such system:
the first Soviet submarine [Zulu class, diesel powered], configured to carry
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, was commissioned already in 1956. Yet the
US had the advantage, for technologically, the Polaris, using solid fuel and better
guidance system was superi or to the Sovier liquid-fuelled system, an d of longer range.
Strategically, the Polaris system submarines were deployed within srriking distance
of the USSR territory, while Soviet Navy could nor respond in kind. American subs
were deployed in the Norwegian Sea, and in the easrern Mediterranean. The Soviet
Navy had co find a way to counter this parricular rhreat, and because of technologi-
cal requirements it had to be found in the same area from which the threat carne.
There was, therefor, a marked increase in Soviet n a val activity in the Mediterra-
nean from che late 1950's and on. If in 1956 Soviet ship-days were about 100,
and in 1957 600 days, in 1958 there were about 1000, more rhan 4000 in 1959,
over 5600 in 1960. Then decrease- only 2300 in 1961, 800 in 1962 and 600
in 1963. Passage of Soviet naval units in the Turkish Straits was on a similar pat-
tern. From a negligible number of ships going through che straits in 1954-1956
{about ten annually] it roseto less than 30 in 195 7, over 40 [combarants and auxi·
liary] in 1958, approximately 90 in 1959, to almost 130 in 1960. Then in 1961-1963
there was a great reduction in numbers of transit through the straits, but from 1964
onward, through the 1970's and 1980's, there was a steady increase in volume and
strength of Soviet naval units going rhrough rhe Turkish strairs.
The key for Soviet naval presence in distane water was having access to shore
bases, better stili establishing Soviet shore bases in these regions. Soviet strategie
decision was, it seems, to counter the threat posed by the 6th Fleet by deploying
Soviet naval units is the same water used by the US. In addition to the sea-control
and sea-denial missions of the Mediterranean flotilla, which were very difficult to
accomplish due to the great conventional superiority of the 6th Fleet, there was
che major problem of its nuclear capability. Therefore it seems Soviet strategy was
to attain che capability to strike at the 6 Fleet before it can launch its missiles and
bombers at the Soviet land. For this purpose Soviet ships were to even give up
the principle of force-economy, even survival, of the flotilla, in order to attain the
ability to strike fast, to preempt a nuclear attack. But Soviet navy in the Mediterra-
nean suffred two serious disadvantages vis-a-vis the 6th Fleet: it did not have air
arm, it did not have land bases. There arose, therefore, the acute need for port
facilities for the ships and submarines, and airfields for the naval aviation. These
could be had only in Albania, then stili a communist country and a Soviet ally.
Already in 1954 Soviet naval units conducred a port visit in Valona, but only from
1958 rhere was a permanent port base in Valona. This was losr, however, in spring
1962. Albania then sided with China in its dispute with the USSR, and became