Page 350 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

336 MATITIAHU MAYZEL

interesting, for this flotilla grew larger and srronger during rhe cime. It was main-
tained on almost constane size during the 1980's. In 1989, just before che end of
the cold war, Soviet naval power in rhe Mediterranean consisred of approximately
40 ships, of which 6-10 were large principal surface combatancs and 5-7 attack
submarines. Most units of this flotilla were of che Black-Sea Fleet, some of che Nor-
thern Fleet. The military reason for che deployment of this force is obvious-to counter
che US 6th Fleet. However, such an argument is not self-evident. The question can
arise whether che initial purposes for the Soviet Mediterranean deployment were
military, i.e. co counrer American naval deployment, or were these political, to fur-
ther Soviet influence? Looking at che history of che cold war in che region, there
is a good reason co argue that it was a politica! mocive for che naval deploymenc.
Indeed, che US preceded che Soviec Union in using ics navy in che Medicerranean
for politica!, not military purposes. Such was the aim of che visit of USS Missouri
in lstanbul in April1946 and USS Franklin D. Roosevelc in Augusc che same year.
Could not Soviet motives be similar- co gain politica! influence? To argue ocherwi-
se would imply that Soviet leaders and Navy commanders ignored che clear infe-
riority of the Soviet naval force against che 6th Fleer and deceived themselves in
pursuing a milicary ends.
Indeed, rhe historiography of Soviet relations with che Middle Easc, as well
as contemporary accounts, perceive Soviet expanding activity in che region in poli-
tica! terms. For the IO or 15 years immediately after WWII, che Soviet Union used
military means co achieve politica! ends. Such was che support of che state of Israel
in 1948, as well as che Czech arms deal with Egypt in 1955. Furthermore, Soviec
military presence in the region until che mid 1960's was negligible, while politica!
accivity intensified. As for che meagre naval activity during this period, ic served
Soviet politica! aims mainly by porr-visits at Middle Eastern councries - Egypt and
Syria- while there is no indication asco che military value of such visi es. However,
che argumenc bere is chac in che late 1950's a change occured Soviec naval stracegy
in regards co che Mediterranean, che resulcs of which were that political-diplomatic
moves carne to function as means co che milicary ends - in complete reverse to
che previous period. The most obvious change was rhe shifc of Soviet strategie ac-
cention from che politica! - che radicalization of the Arab councries of che Middle
Easc co che milicary - che Medicerranean Sea icself and the growing threac posed
to the USSR by the power of the US 6th Fleec. The history of che Soviet Mediterra-
nean Flotilla is closely related co che history of rhe 6th Fleet.
There is a good and voluminous body of historical an d strategie literature o n
che development of American Cold War navy, and on ics ballistic missiles. The
American decision co develop and deploy a 1500 mile land and sea based ba1Iistic
missile was taken in September 1955, by recommendation of che National Security
Council. Four years larer, in December 1959, the nuclear artack submarine Geor-
ge Washington [SSBN-598) was commissioned. Half a year later, in July 1960,
che underwater la un eh of che Polaris nuclear ballisti c missile system was tested.