Page 349 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

SOVIET STRATEGIC NAVAL INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IN THE 1960's

MATITIAHU MAYZEL

There is nothing new in the presence of Russian (and Soviet) fleet in the Me-
diterranean. In modern times this phenomenon srarted with che appearance ofRussia
as a major European military power in the early 18th century, and became a con-
stane factor of maritime history. lt diminished greatly in the following century, af-
ter the Napoleonic war, when the Russian Empire suffred a long, noticeable
diplomatic and military decline. The weakness of che USSR in the interwar peri od,
politica! and diplomatic, military and naval, also precluded naval presence in the
Mediterranean. Even after the victory in 1945, when the USSR appeared as one
of the two great superpowers, the situation changed very lirtle. Only che internatio-
nal quarrels on the status of the Turkish straits, which brought the cold war into
the Middle East, signalled what may come. lt was only in the 1950's, after the death
of Stalin, that Soviet naval units appeared in the Mediterranea n. Thus Soviet naval
presence in the Mediterranean did not become a strategie problem before che late
1950's. It took an acute form in the 1960's and 1970's, and ceased to be a pro-
blem sometimes in the 1980's. During this relatively short period, Soviet Mediter-
ranean flotilla was a major strategie problem not only for the two great super powers,
but also for ali Mediterranean states, in particular those of the Middle East. In this
respect, i t was part of che col d war fought in the middle east, an d, simultaneously,
also one component, among many, of the local conflicts in the region - the most
noticeable of which was the arab-israeli conflict. Like all historical problems, great
and small, this one was not resolved, but disappeared, and reappeared in a chan-
ged, different form. In this case it ceased to be a global-strategic problem and tur-
ned into a regional one. Yet, on the regionallevel, too, the problem has drastically
changed, perhaps to the verge of disappearance.
Therefore the short history of Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean pre-
sents a number of historical problems, each of which requires a different explana-
tion. One explanation, relating to the global-strategic aspect, is "technological":
the development of technologically more advanced weapon systems made naval de-
ployment in this confined, relatively closed and small inner sea, unnecessary (and
perhaps also dangerous) for the strategie task previously assigned to the Soviet flo-
tilla. There is a paradox here, for the Soviet Navy continued to operate in the Me-
diterranean, even when the global-strategicneeds disappeared. The case is even more