Page 353 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

SOVIET STRATEGIC NAVAL INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES 339

to Soviet pressure. Naval visits and services provided co Soviet ships turned, in
result of rhe 1967 war, to be permanent Sovier naval (and air) facilities. These be-
carne Soviet bases on Egyprian soil, where they provided exclusive services to So-
viet naval units, were manned by Soviet personnel, with Soviet guards at the gates
controlling access, subordinate to Soviet command. Soviet naval aviation was granted
rights too, and Soviet reconnaissance flights took off from these bases - over the
Mediterranean, over the 6th Fleet. Soviet vessels were permanently present in Egyp-
tian ports and harbors as follows: At Alexandria were floating workshops, floating
docks, ammunirion warehouses [including nuclear rorpedoes] and mainrenance fa-
cilities and floating hospitals. In addition, a Sovier communications base consisting
of some buildings, surrounded by Soviet guards, was erected near the town~ At
Port Said there was another, smaller base, with installations similar to those at Ale-
xandria. At Mersa Matruh construction work was clone and Soviet vessels ancho-
red very often. Soviets ships anchored in the Gulf of Sollum, but there were no
port facilities. Severa! hundred Soviet naval personnel operated in those Soviet floating
facilities. In addition, Soviet naval aviation aircrafts operated from three Egyptian
Airbases. About 22 aircrafts, mainly TU-16s, AN-12s and four IL-38s. These air-
craft carried out electronic-reconnaissance missions from Cairo W est, Mersa Ma-
cruth and Aswan Airbases over the Sixth Fleet, identifying themselves as Egyptian
aircraft. In some cases che targets were l.D.F. radio electronic and radar installarions.
This activity of Soviet Mediterranean flotilla had a strategie mission - to counter
the strategie threat posed by the 6th Fleet. This was a supreme strategie interest
of the Soviet Union, and this was the source for Soviet military aid to Egypt in
the 1960's and 1970's. Let me repeat was said before- the politica! interest sprung
from this strategie military need. The same strategie interest dictated Soviet overall
behavior: it was defensive, and aim at avoiding military clash with American and
NATO forces. This interest, then, dictated Soviet behavior in the Egypdan-Israeli
confliet. Soviet policy was to prevent the escalation of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict
into a superpower military confrontation. This neccesitated strengthening Egypt
and defending Egypt against lsraeli superiority, lest anorher war breaks, with in-
creased danger of superpower active involvement. Thus Soviet support of Egypt
was, in reality, aimed not to help Egypt achieve its military objectives, but preser-
ving Soviet naval bases, ensuring continuing activity of the Mediterranean flocilla.
The improvement and increase of Soviet technieal ability and the devolop-
ment of the Soviet Navy changed this straregy. When Soviet Mediterranean flotilla
achieved ability co conduce operations independent of land bases, there was no need
anymore to support Egypt. The introduction into che Mediterranean of higher class
ships, with longer range, addirion of auxiliaries, made the Mediterranean flotilla
independent. Bue this also made this flotilla superfluous. Development of higher
class submarine launched ballistic missiles, both by the US and the USSR, transfer-
red the contested warers from the Mediterranean to the open deep oceans. The es-
sence of the strategie threat changed, and with it the structure, composition and
operations of the Soviet Mediterranean naval force.