Page 352 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

338 .MATITIAHU MAYZEL

an aJly of che former. The use of p ore faciliti es in Valona was denied to the Soviet
ships. The quest started rhen for another Mediterranean country, where Soviet na-
valland-bases could be established. Also, che loss ofValona forche Soviet use can
explain che great reduction in ship-days and in traffic through the Turkish straits
by Soviet naval units.
The loss of the porc facilicies in Valona resulced in renewed attempcs co achie-
ve independent naval presence in the Medicerranean, and hydrographic units of
che Black-Sea Fleet started a preliminary survey for that purpose. However, this
ability was not attained for some years to come. Egypt, then became the target of
Soviet efforts co find navalland bases. But the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul
Nasser, would not gran t su eh rights to Soviet forces. In 1961, with che breakdown
of che politica! union with Syria, Egypt entered a new phase in ics attempt co achie-
ve uncontested leadership role in the Arab world. Egypt also attempted to reesta-
blish ics role as a major nonaligned country, cried co increase ties wich China and
co puc relations with che US on a new basis. On the ocher hand, the Soviec Union
was very careful in relations wich Egypt. The tense relations were exposed already
in 1960, bue even before thac Egypt received only sma11 portion of ics requested
armamene. In 1962 Egypt starred her involvement in the war in Y eme n, and her
military needs grew appreciably. The source for milicary materia!- che USSR-
was noc so eager co fulfill Egypcian requesrs. Thus from 1963 the form of Soviet
milicary aid co Egypt was a clear reflection of the politica! relations becween the
two countries. The situation changed in favour of che Soviet Union in 1964, when
a crisis developed in American-Egyptian relations. The removal of Khrushchev from
the Soviet leadership and the ascendancy ofKosigin and Brezhnev opened new ave-
nues in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Soviet economie aid to Egypt increased, and with
che loss of American economie aid, especially wheat, Egypc carne to depend more
and more on Soviet aid.
f.rnprovement in Soviet-Egyptian relations reflected well in movement of So-
viet naval units in che Mediterranean. Number of ship-days grew appreciably: from
1800 in 1964 to 3700 in 1965, 5400 in 1966, and the year later - the year of
che Six Days war wich Israel - co 8800 Soviec ship-days. This activity increased,
gradually and steadily, to the peak of more chan 20000 Soviec ship-days in 1974
and 1975, in che wake of the other Israeli-Egyptian war, of October 1973. Bue
from this peak che numbers decrease, co abouc 17000 in the mid-1980's. Not ali
these Soviec ships carne from the Black-Sea Fleet, as some carne from the Norch
Fleet, also che Indian Ocean Flocilla. From 1964 there was another pattern of So-
viet naval activity- great increase of port visits in Egypt. Once agreemenc on this
was arrived at between the two countries, Soviet ships began their visits, gradually
extending their stay longer than provided for in che eagreementn. The Israeli vicco-
ry in che Six Days War gave the Soviet Navy an opporcuniry to gaio righcs denied
from her by Egypt unti! then. The Egyptian dire need for military ai d, in equi p-
me n t, weapons, technical and milicary expertise, made Egypt very susceptible