Page 255 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
6. The end of the mission
During the summer of 1897 the great powers drafted a programme which saw Crete
as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of the sultan, ruled by a governor. The se-
58
lection of the governor proved to be a contentious business and eventually led to dishar-
mony among the great powers. After several candidates had been rejected, in late 1897
the Russians and French came forward with the proposal of Prince George of Greece as
a candidate, a plan that was fiercely opposed by Germany and Austria-Hungary. For-
59
eign Minister Gołuchowski even threatened to end Austria-Hungary’s participation in
the peace-keeping mission, as the appointment of the prince would signify a significant
change in the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean. But Russia and France man-
aged to convince Britain and Italy to support the Greek prince’s nomination. During the
whole of January and February 1898 Gołuchowski and the Austro-Hungarian ambassa-
dor at Constantinople Baron Heinrich Calice negotiated with the representatives of the
other great powers trying to find a compromise – but in vain.
At the end of February 1898 the German ambassador at Constantinople, Baron Adolf
Marschall von Bieberstein, reported to the Chancellor of the German Empire, Prince
Chlodwig von Hohenlohe, in Berlin that the alliance was “in a state of complete mess“ ,
60
whereupon Germany ordered the withdrawal of its contingent by 16 March 1898. Em-
peror Francis Joseph followed the example and the policy of his German ally to whom
he was linked by the Dual Alliance of 1879 . In a circular decree of 23 March 1898
61
Foreign Minister Gołuchowski informed the Austro-Hungarian ambassadors at Saint
nd
Petersburg, London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin that the squadron and the 2 battalion of
62
th
the 87 infantry regiment were to return home.
On 12 April the infantry battalion left Suda thus ending Austria-Hungary’s peace-
keeping mission to Crete. Farewell ceremony (Dell’Adami, Streitkräfte)

58 HHStA, PA XII 286, Liasse XXXVIII Kretensische Frage 1897 VI-IX, unfol.: Ambassade de la République
Francaise à Vienne, Propositions du Gouvernement Francais au sujet de la Crète, Vienna, 9.6.1897. See also
Pangerl, Die Kreta-Mission der k.u.k. Kriegsmarine, p. 107f.; Verosta, Kollektivaktionen der Mächte des
Europäischen Konzerts, p. 108.
59 HHStA, PA XII 289, Liasse XXXVIII Kretensische Frage 1898 I-II, fol. 2: Ladislaus von Szögyény-Marich
(Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Berlin) to Gołuchowski, Berlin, 2.1.1898.
60 Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des
Auswärtigen Amtes, vol. 12/p. 2: Alte und neue Balkanhändel 1896-1899, Berlin 1923, p. 486.
61 The alliance had a purely defensive character and its main aim was to prevent or limit war, especially in case
of an attack by Russia. The latter had burst an alliance with the other two, the so-called Three Emperorsʼ
Alliance, mainly because of conflicts of interest with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and therefore more than
ever before posed a threat to the carefully cherished balance of power.
62 Verosta, Kollektivaktionen der Mächte des Europäischen Konzerts, p. 165; Zürrer, Die Nahostpolitik
Frankreichs und Rußlands, p. 391; HHStA, PA XII 290, Liasse XXXVIII, Kretensische Frage 1898 II-IV,
unfol.: telegram to various ambassadors and diplomatic missions in Europe, Vienna, 23.3.1898; ibid., unfol.:
Gołuchowski to Pinter, Vienna, 24.3.1898 (draft). As one of the main reasons Gołuchowski stated that „the
negotiations between the powers on the regulation of the situation in Crete had not reached any significant
progress for a longer time“ and therefore there was the concern of either a „mess“ or „such a solution for the
Cretan Question […] for which we do not want to take the responsibility“.