Page 416 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

416 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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on Lake Ladoga.
The German contingent consisted mainly of Siebel ferries (auxiliary gunboats), land-
ing craft assault, fast minelayers and some support vessels. They were accompanied by
four Italian MAS motor torpedo boats (MTBs). No Finnish boats were involved in the
operations.
All these vessels were tactically attached to the Finnish Navy, under the name naval
task unit Kijanen, and they were ready for action in July 1942 (only the command ar-
rangement of the naval units was confirmed in writing!). Finnish Colonel E. I. Järvinen
led the naval detachment operations only. For other matters the German ferries were
responsible to Luftlotte 1. On the Finnish side, the FHC and the HQs of the Air Force,
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Navy and Ladoga Coastal Brigade were involved in the planning work.
In August 1944 the Germans revealed to the Finns that the mission of their boats had
been changed to tightening the ring around Leningrad. From then on the German boats
conducted several attacks. In late October they failed in their raid against a lighthouse
island. The Italian motor torpedo boats protected the ferries and were not allowed to
conduct independent missions. The strength of the multinational naval detachment was
inadequate. The Germans suffered heavy casualties for minor results. Operations were
complicated further by difficult conditions (especially the shallowness of the waters)
and technical problems. The naval detachment was then abolished and the boats were
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transferred to other duties.
Case 3: Joint and Combined Approaches on the Karelian Isthmus during the Sum-
mer of 1944
In the summer of 1944 the Finnish Army was faced with the Red Army’s fourth
strategic offensive to push Finland out of the war. Finnish defensive operations were
aimed at blocking the main Soviet thrusts and centred on the Karelian Isthmus. These
operations came closest to a joint (and combined) approach. The battles in one main
operational area were co-ordinated and synchronised under a single commander.
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6 Operation orders of the Naval Detachment K(ijanen), May–October 1942. Salainen kirjeenvaihto 1942,
Laatokan Rannikkoprikaatin arkisto, T 8491/4, KA; Karjalainen 2009, 219, 226–227; Jatkosodan historia
6, 1994, 78–80. For a general overview of the operations of the Finnish-German-Italian flotilla see K.
Kijanen’s treatise “Laivastotoiminta Laatokalla v. 1942” (1947). Historiateoksen esitöitä ym tutkielmia,
Sotahistoriallisen toimiston arkisto, T 20773/11d, KA.
7 E. I. Järvinen’s diary entries, 17 May–30 October 1942. E. I. Järvisen kokoelma, PK 2405/2, KA; After-action
reports of the Naval Detachment K(ijanen) May–October 1942. Laivasto-osasto K:n käskyjä ja kertomuksia
1942, Laatokan Rannikkoprikaatin arkisto, T 8491/4, KA. See also the situation reports by units operating on
Lake Ladoga to the operations branch of the Finnish Navy HQ during the summer and autumn 1942. Joukko-
osastojen tilannetiedotuksia 1942, Merivoimien Esikunnan operatiivisen osaston arkisto, T 15758/1194, KA;
Jatkosodan historia 6, 1994, 79; Karjalainen 2009, 219, 226–233, 239–240.
8 K. Kijanen’s treatise “Laivastotoiminta Laatokalla v. 1942” (1947). Historiateoksen esitöitä ym tutkielmia,
Sotahistoriallisen toimiston arkisto, T 20773/11d, KA, 4–17; T. V. Viljanen’s diary entries, 23–24 October
1942. Kenraaliluutnantti T. V. Viljasen kokoelma, PK 1240/96, KA; Karjalainen 2009, 222–225, 234–239.
9 Interview with Professor Pasi Kesseli, 5 March 2013; Ville Vänskä, ”Yhteisoperaation johtaminen”.
Kylkirauta n:o 1/2013, 11.