Page 419 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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The chains of command were complicated, and there were several commanders. The
troops fighting in the northern section of the Bay were from the Cavalry Brigade under
the V Army Corps. The southern part of the coastline and the islands, where the enemy
had placed its centre of gravity, were defended by coastal forces under the Navy. Yet
they were fighting like infantrymen. Their co-operation was hindered by a lack of both
17
signal equipment and experience.
The Navy HQ had a hierarchical command culture, and it often interfered in tactical
matters even concerning individual companies. Local commanders had to receive ap-
proval from the top. Co-ordination was limited to the ground forces’ support requests
to the Navy and Air Force. The Light Naval Detachment did not have a functioning
connection to its own HQ let alone to the ground forces. Unlike the ground forces, the
coastal forces did not have air force liaison officers. This meant that the ground forces
managed to pass their requests swiftly, whereas the coastal forces use the proper chan-
nels all the way to the Commander of the Navy. The Navy HQ’s decision-making and
planning process was cumbersome and slow. Thus it was no surprise that the Light
Naval Detachment tried to contain the arrival of the Red Army forces to the area by sea
and support the ground forces in defending the archipelago. This independent action
under the Navy HQ failed as it was not co-ordinated to support the overall operational
aims because the coastal forces had no connection to the troops fighting ashore. The
detachment did not have air cover either, and since the Soviets enjoyed almost total air
control of the area, the mission was doomed. The forces scattered on the islands were not
used economically as they were ordered to counter-attack to take back all positions lost.
Due to the Commander of the Navy’s obstinate demands to hold on to the islands, the
nd
22 Coastal Artillery Regiment suffered particularly high casualties. They had neither
proper equipment nor experience and the rocky islands were difficult to fortify.
18
Therefore it should come as no surprise that in early July after several days of fierce
fighting the Finns lost the key islands situated in the middle of the Bay of Vyborg. In the
aftermath, the Finnish troops were reorganized and regrouped on the Western shore of
the Bay. The remains of the 22 Coastal Artillery Regiment was attached to the V Army
nd
Corps. Yet the dropping of one echelon clarified the command. The V Army Corps HQ
was closer with better signal and liaison connections than the Navy HQ, and therefore,
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a much better view of the situation.
The new command arrangement simplified the defence. Operations conducted on the

17 FHC’s order concerning the areas of responsibility in the Bay of Vyborg, 17 June 1944. KaJoKen
operatiivisen osaston kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5,
KA; Jatkosodan historia 5 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1992), 224–225, 232; Mälkki 2007, 62–64; Talvitie 2011, 49.
18 Lappalainen 1983, 21, 214–215; Koskimaa 1996, 110–113; Mälkki 2007, 62–66; Talvitie 2011, 35–37, 41,
51, 54–58, 62, 65–70; Eino Pukkila, Taisteluhälytys – Suomen laivasto jatkosodassa (Porvoo: WSOY, 1961),
244–249; Per-Olof Ekman, Meririntama – Merisotatapahtumat Itämeren pohjoisosassa 1941–44 (Juva:
WSOY, 1983), 269–271; A. E. Lyytinen, ”RTR 22:n taistelut Viipurinlahdella”. In: Koivisto ja Viipurinlahti
1939–1944 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1958), 261–290.
19 Commander of the Navy’s order to reorganize the coastal forces, 14 July 1944. KaJoKen operatiivisen osaston
kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5, KA; Koskimaa 1996,
116–120; Talvitie 2011, 32, 60, 64; Jatkosodan historia 5, 1992, 237–238.