Page 418 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

418 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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were used effectively in order to support the impact and achieve synergy.
It is not easy to examine Finnish operations on the Karelian Isthmus from a joint
viewpoint because they were fought simultaneously in three separate directions. Oesch
was not able to show flexibility or use his forces optimally, and, in the face of a formi-
dable foe, he was forced to resort to a standard method of defence. Finnish manuals
instructed that the main defensive position, that was the last line of defence, had to be in
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the hands of the defenders after the battle.
After its breakthrough the Red Army took the city of Vyborg and Finnish resistance
intensified on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet troops attempted to open a new front by
advancing along the Viipurinlahti/Bay of Vyborg (as they had done during the Winter
War), and advance to the right flank and rear of the Finnish main forces, threatening their
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supply lines.
In the Bay of Vyborg, all services were fighting together in a small area. Yet the gen-
eral features of a joint operation are not apparent in this case. The operation did not have
a clear beginning and end; it was a continuation of earlier delaying tactics. The troops
were not under a unified command. The area of operations had been divided between
Oesch’s troops under the V Army Corps and the Navy, each led by their own HQs. The
V Army Corps had a traditional infantry corps HQ, not a joint staff in the real sense of
the word. The liaison arrangements between the Navy and ground forces were insuf-
ficient. There was a Navy liaison officer at the V Army Corps HQ, but the co-operation
between the Navy and Air Forces was even worse, with no similar arrangement made.
The Bay of Vyborg operation was more a quest for synergy and joint fire than proper
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synchronization.
Co-operation was conducted mainly at the high HQ and corps levels. In the Bay
area, these negotiations and agreements were not enough. At the tactical level it practi-
cally meant just conveying messages. The HQs were far away from the fighting troops;
the Navy HQ was 200 kilometres away. This meant that requests from lower echelons
and the execution of orders could be critically delayed. The operation was not carefully
planned and the use of forces was not co-ordinated.
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12 The orders issued by the HQ of the Finnish Air Forces in late June 1944. Operatiivisia käskyjä 1944,
Ilmavoimien Esikunnan operatiivisen ja koulutustoimiston arkisto (Ye. 3), T 19283/110a, KA; K. L. Oesch,
Suomen kohtalon ratkaisu Kannaksella v. 1944 (Helsinki: Otava, 1957), 95; Palokangas & Vänskä 2011,
56; Juha Mälkki, “Kävimme verisiä saaristotaisteluja – Joint-operaatio Viipurinlahdella 4.–5.7.1944”.
Suomen Sotilas n:o 1/2007, 64; Mälkki 2010, 11; Markkinen 2011, 37; Pasi Kesseli, ”Ilmapuolustuksen
johtamisjärjestelmä jatkosodassa.” In: Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen, eds. Antti Juutilainen & Jari Leskinen
(Porvoo: WSOY, 2006), 911; Markku Lamppu, IV Armeijakunnan ilmatorjunnan järjestelyt vetäytymisvaiheen
taisteluissa 1944. Treatise, National Defence University 2007, 46–47.
13 Markkinen 2011, 52–53.
14 Matti Koskimaa, Torjuntavoitto Viipurinlahdella kesällä 1944 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1996), 68.
15 Niilo Lappalainen, Veren kostuttamat saaret (Saarijärvi: Kustannuspiste, 1983), 19–20; Niilo Lappalainen,
Viipurinlahti kesällä 1944 (Juva: WSOY, 1988), 280–284; Koskimaa 1996, 70; Mälkki 2010, 11, Mälkki
2007, 64; Vänskä 2010, 31; Talvitie 2011, 23, 35, 44, 50, 63–64, 69.
16 Mälkki 2010, 12; Talvitie 2011, 47, 51, 64.