Page 417 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
On 15 June 1944, Lieutenant General Karl Lennart Oesch received a short directive
from Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim giving him instructions to stabilize the situation,
which was becoming critical. Oesch had all the Army units under his command, and
strategic support. The unity of command was not compromised by the intrusions of poli-
ticians. General Oesch was aided by a joint headquarters under which the functions of all
services (except the Navy) were placed in the same echelon. Oesch did not have a total
control over his troops since the Corps answered directly to the FHC in personnel and
supply matters. However, since Mannerheim kept some strategic reserves under Oesch’s
command, he was also able to influence these.
10
The establishment of a new command echelon eased the burden of the FHC. The
decision-making process was speeded up by centralizing command in one pair of hands,
giving the new front HQs more leeway and role in operational planning. In a highly fluid
situation, Oesch did not interfere in the activities of lower level leaders. He had to focus
on the operation as a whole and he trusted his subordinate commanders, so he chose to
employ mission-type orders. Mannerheim urged Oesch to take back lost defensive posi-
tions but he insisted on further withdrawal to the last prepared line of defence. Oesch,
who knew the situation well, was able to change his mission according to his own op-
11
erational approach and intent.
Time was pressing, and Oesch did not have enough time to develop a sound plan of
operations. He assumed command when the battles had already started. Initially Oesch
did not possess a sufficiently accurate view of the situation until the air force liaison
officer was included in Oesch’s HQ. This was also the channel through which ground
forces made requests for air support, and through which Oesch and his staff received
intelligence on the enemy’s ground and air forces. Furthermore, the arrival of the Ger-
man dive-bomber Squadron Kuhlmey gave Oesch both air-to-ground capability and a
significant addition to close air support for the ground units, but only in the most danger-
ous directions. The Air Forces were preoccupied with supporting the ground troops in
the decisive battle of Tali–Ihantala further north. Bombing sorties and artillery barrages

10 Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim’s instructions to Lieutenant General K. L. Oesch, 15 June 1944 and General
Erik Heinrichs’s (the Head of the Finnish General Staff) letter to all higher commanders about new chains of
command, 14 and 16 June 1944. Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan (hereafter cited as KaJoKe)
operatiivisen osaston kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5,
KA; Secret correspondence between Oesch’s HQ’s operations branch and the FHC, summer 1944. Ibid. T
5761/4–6, KA; Lasse Laaksonen, Eripuraa ja arvovaltaa: Mannerheimin ja kenraalien henkilösuhteet ja
johtaminen (Jyväskylä: Ajatus Kirjat, 2004), 275–281; Talvitie 2011, 49–50; Karjalainen 2009, 262–264.
11 Karjalainen 2009, 262–264; Tuomas Markkinen, Ilmatoiminnan johtaminen Karjalan Kannaksen
torjuntataisteluissa kesällä 1944. Treatise, National Defence University 2011, 36.