Page 424 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

424 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

lett, who led the naval force. 15
In rough terms, air support for Jubilee was provided in three layers. High squadrons,
primarily concerned with air superiority controlled from Uxbridge; low level squadrons
tasked to protect the ships controlled from the destroyer HMS Berkely, and close air sup-
port controlled from the Calpe. Orders and requests were issued by, or through, the sen-
ior air staff present. Air intelligence estimated that the Luftwaffe had approximately 250
aircraft, primarily fighters, with which to oppose the assault. Bombers were available,
but it would take time for them to move to the attack from their normal operating bases. 16
Air reconnaissance was provided by Mustang aircraft from the fledgling Army Co-
operation Command. They primary task was to keep a look out for approaching Ger-
man reinforcements to Dieppe which would then be attacked by day bombers. As they
roamed far beyond Allied fighter cover they suffered disproportionate losses. Once they
completed their sorties, they were to check in with Calpe on the way back to England.
Upon landing, the information they gathered was relayed to Uxbridge via land line.
Close air support was provided by Hurricane and select Spitfire squadrons, plus light
bombers from No. 2 Group. The bombers were directed to attack specific guns posi-
tions, as well as lay smoke, while the Hurricanes were directed to attack strong points on
the waterfront using bombs and cannon. Their attacks were heaviest during the initial
landing and withdrawal, deemed to be the two most dangerous times for the operation,
and these were launched at pre-determined times. They returned periodically throughout
the operation as requested by the Force Commander on Calpe and were to check in with
the controller on board for employment.
The close air support had mixed results. The smoke was effective in blinding Ger-
man gunners, but had the unexpected result of making it more difficult for the command-
ers to see what was happening ashore. Attacks were delivered with great bravery, but ac-
curacy was lacking and the weight of ordnance insufficient to silence German positions.
There was no way for the ground forces on the beach to communicate with the attacking
aircraft, nor were there trained Air Force personnel (as there was for Naval gunfire) with
the troops to assist in calling down air strikes. Requests for support were relayed via the
Calpe and could take up to an hour to action. These aircraft suffered primarily from
17
enemy, and friendly, anti-aircraft fire. A post operation report diplomatically pointed out
that Naval air recognition needed to be improved. 18
On average, there were between three and six fighter squadrons over the beach at any
time with the highest numbers present for the landing and withdrawal. They were di-

15 It had been decided that the operation would be “Jointly” commanded by these three senior officers with no
one in overall control. DHH, Historical Report No. 100, 8.
16 For a complete overview of the RAF’s organization for Dieppe, including the command and control
arrangements see UKNA, AIR 25/204, “Report by the Air Force Commander on the Combined Operation
Against Dieppe – 19 August 1942.”
17 DHH, Historical Report No. 108, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The
Execution of the Operation,” 17 Dec 43, 61. The delay in message traffic would range from a few minutes
to over an hour. See also DHH File 594.013(D1), “The Dieppe Raid (Combined Report),” October 1942,
Appendix B to Annex 7, “Detailed Chronological Air Narrative.”
18 UKNA, AIR 16/784, “Dieppe Report: Covering Letter by Air Force Commander”, 5 September 1942, 3.