Page 426 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

426 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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mandy. Indeed, Leigh-Mallory in his final report on the operation wrote that Dieppe
…proved conclusively that the existing Fighter ground control organi-
zation, although primarily designed for defensive purposes, provides all the
facilities required for the direction of offensive operations within normal
fighter range.
To summarize – the system of control from the Group, though Sectors,
and through the Headquarters Ships [sic], adequately met all requirements.
The excellent communications and flexible control facilities of the normal
Fighter organization at home proved most efficient for such combined op-
erations. 22
Be as wary of success as you are of failure. Given the scope of the disaster, there
was a need to focus on a “win”. The perceived victory of the RAF over the Luftwaffe
contributed to the acceptance of unrealistic claims on the amount of damage the enemy
had sustained. If the numbers had been correct, almost two thirds of the Luftwaffe’s
strength in Western Europe had been damaged or destroyed, yet they managed to mount
a series of attacks in the days following Dieppe and subsequent Allied fighter sweeps did
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not report a lessening of German activity. The inconsistencies were explained away
rather than being a cause for re-examining the outcome of the raid.
Bravery and skill are not always a substitute for lack of training. Dieppe was mount-
ed before changes to combined operations training could be fully implemented, but there
had still be a somewhat lax approach to close air support training undertaken by the
Royal Air Force. Within the fighter community, this type of training had been virtually
non existent, as the doctrinal approach indicated that it would be business as usual for
this force. In fact, many of the squadrons only learned of the raid, and their role in it,
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the night prior to their first sortie.
Command and control procedures that serve an institutional purpose, especially in
peacetime, are not always the best for wartime. The rather fractured command process
implemented at Dieppe where control was divided between two ships and Uxbridge,
with a pre-determined support schedule, may have kept the unity of Air Force command
intact, but it was extremely inflexible and time consuming. Hence when the Force Com-
mander wanted to withdraw his forces from the beaches at 1030 hours, he was advised
to wait an extra half hour to permit the support aircraft to fly to their home bases, re-arm

21 Again and again the extent of the RAF’s “victory” over the Luftwaffe became the “official” view of the
Dieppe raid and no one was more vigorous in trumpeting this point of view than Churchill who stated in
Parliament that “This raid, apart from the information and reconnaissance value, brought about an extremely
satisfactory air battle in the west, which the Fighter Command [sic] wished they could repeat every week.”
Reported in DHH, Historical Report No. 109, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42, Part
III: Some Special Aspects,” 17 December 1943, 14.
22 DHH File 75/283, “The Dieppe Raid – Report by the Air Force Commander,” 4.
23 Indeed, by the day after the attack (20 August), the Luftwaffe had replaced or repaired the majority of it lost
and damaged aircraft. DHH SCR II 322, Luftflotte 3 Headquarters, “British Large-scale Landing Operation
at Dieppe – Second Appreciation,” 28 August 1942.
24 For an overview of the training provided see Mahoney, 80-88.