Page 425 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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vided into “low squadrons” that operated between two and five thousand feet to protect
the ships and beaches attacked any enemy aircraft that made it past the Spitfire squad-
rons above. High squadrons operated primarily about 10000 feet and were to engage
the enemy aircraft as they approached. Except for the occasional hit and run attack by
a German aircraft, the RAF fighters achieved and maintained air superiority. However,
despite the number of squadrons involved, the Germans could, and did, have the initia-
tive and at times outnumbered the defending fighters. Had more enemy aircraft been
available, or if their intelligence had been better in identifying times at which the fighter
cover was the weakest, they could have overwhelmed the defenders. As it was, the num-
ber of Allied aircraft lost exceeded those of the Luftwaffe by more than two to one, but
this was unknown at the time. Only one major vessel was sunk during the Dieppe raid,
the Berkeley, and German attacks had been successfully broken up or deflected.
At that time, the RAF’s performance was lauded as the one success during the raid.
Estimates of enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged, even though they turned out to be in-
correct, seemed to point to a great victory for Fighter Command. And disparity in losses
aside, the RAF deserved the praise as it had done its job in accordance with its doctrine
and to the best of its ability. 19
Much as been written about the lessons that can be derived from Dieppe and many,
including some of the primary commanders, have stated that information and experi-
ence gained during JUBILEE were instrument in the success of the Normandy landings
20
in June 1944. It may be argued that landings in the Pacific, or North Africa, or Sicily
and Italy, offered the same, if not better lessons, however, an in depth analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, here are a few observations on the RAF’s performance
at Dieppe.
Sometimes an Air Force actually reads, and applies, its own doctrine. This is what
the RAF did at Dieppe, however, a case could be made that this doctrine, developed dur-
ing a prolonged period of peace without adequate testing, was flawed; especially with
respect to command and control. Unfortunately, the perceived success of the Air Force
at Dieppe meant there was little incentive to change existing doctrine and may have
complicated the establishment of the successful tactical air force programme for Nor-

19 Within the British War Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary remarked on the “…notable achievement of the Royal
th
Air Force.” UKNA, CAB/65/31/18, War Ministry (42), 115 Conclusions, Minute 1, Confidential Annex
th
(20 August, 1942 – 6.0 p.m.), 2.
20 For example Captain Hughes-Hallett, who commanded the naval forces at Dieppe, the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, and no less a personage than Churchill himself, have stated at various
times that the Dieppe raid was essential to the success of a full-scale invasion of France, DHH, Historical
Report No. 159, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe 19 Aug 14, Additional Information on
Planning”, 5 October 1946. For detailed examinations of potential lessons garnered from Dieppe see DHH,
History Report No. 128, “The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42 – Some New Information,” 20 November
1944; Stacey, 387-412; and Nigel Jones, “What We Learned…from the Dieppe Raid,” Military History,
Volume 26, No. 5, January 2010, 17.