Page 427 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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and return because the Air Force had planned for an 1100 hour withdrawal.
Given the level of combined operations doctrinal develop, and the relative lack of
formal practice between combined operations forces and the RAF, and especially Fighter
Command, air integration at Dieppe was much more than “wishful thinking.” To a very
great extent the policies and procedures put in place represented the best that could be
expected for inter-service cooperation in 1942, albeit from a United Kingdom – Western
Front point of view. The RAF had succeeded in supporting a major landing and, accord-
ing to the pundits of the day, had won an outstanding victory. Still, it was fortunate that
the D-Day invasion would not be attempted for almost another two years permitting the
continued weakening of a determined enemy and the inculcation of experience gained in
other theatres of war. Following the path that led to “victory” in the skies over Dieppe
might have led to a much more difficult experience for the soldiers and sailors that as-
saulted the Normandy beaches in 1944.

25 DHH, Historical Report No. 101, “Operation ‘JUBILLEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 1942. Part II: The
Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks,” 11 August 1943, 56.