Page 52 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

52 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

The Armed Forces as an instrument of International Politics
Fifty years ago, the Englishman Sir Michael Howard, one of the masters of mili-
tary history, indeed of history tout court, wrote: “In truth it is not easy to understand
how international relations could take place and international order be maintained in the
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complete absence of military power” . Diplomacy, wrote in turn Hans J. Morgenthau,
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“has three instruments: persuasion, compromise and threat of the use of force” . In 1844,
Lord Palmerston addressed the House of Commons with these words: “Influence abroad
is maintained only by putting in place one or the other of two principles: hope and fear
[...] Powerful countries must be induced to fear they will encounter the opposition of
England against any unfair act either against ourselves or those who are bound to us by
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ties of friendship” .
The Armed Forces are used to fight wars, but also as an instrument of pressure to pre-
vent their outbreak, through dissuasion, deterrence or a minimal use of force. Regarding
the first task, fighting wars, strategists who follow the “realist approach” emphasize the
importance of technological progress and underestimate historical and ethical-political
factors, seeking the silver bullet that would provide the “final solution” to wars. How-
ever, technological superiority cannot be decisive in irregular wars (Vietnam, Iraq, Af-
ghanistan). “Air power can wreak havoc, punish and destroy, but it cannot dominate,
maintain and control land or surface areas. It may delay, harass and obstruct land com-
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munication, but it cannot interrupt it completely all by itself” , as the Americans real-
ized with reference to the “Ho Chi Minh trail” during the Vietnam War. Moreover, there
are “no military solutions to an ethnic conflict or civil war. Force can only create the
conditions that make a political solution possible. It can then do certain things, but not
others. It can, for example, separate the two ethnic groups [...] but it cannot force them
to live together“ . At one time, wars were intended only to defeat the opponent and the
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winner was not concerned about the political management and the reconstruction of the
defeated country. During the last wars, “the political objectives to be pursued - a change
in regime, conflict resolution, stabilization, democratization, peace enforcement, etc..
- cannot be achieved with a military victory” .
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Moving on to the second task of the Armed Forces, an instrument to exert pressure
at the service of foreign policy, the question of whether air power has replaced mari-
time power as the choice instrument to support diplomacy has been debated. The Navy
has traditionally been considered as the most “diplomatic” Armed Force, the one most

6 M. Howard, Military Power and International Order, in International Affairs, July 1964, p. 405. Naturally,
“international order” is not to be necessarily intended as a synonym for “international justice”.
7 H. J. Morgenthau, Italian edition of Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Politica tra
le nazioni: la lotta per il potere e la pace, Bologna 1997, p. 506).
8 Quoted in A. Briggs, Italian edition of The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867 (L’età del progresso. L’Inghilter-
ra fra il 1783 e il 1867, Bologna 1987, p. 405.)
9 H. W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, New York 1970. p. 36.
10 C. Jean, Alleanza Atlantica. Gestione delle crisi e dei conflitti, in Rivista Militare, 1995, no. 3, pp. 37-43.
11 Id., Nuove Forze armate per nuovi interventi militari, in M. de Leonardis-G. Pastori (edited by), Le nuove
sfide per la forza militare e la diplomazia: il ruolo della NATO, Bologna 2007, p. 70.