Page 113 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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terinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice.
COIN Principles and Laws
The main principles of Galula’s COIN theory focus on the population and its divi-
sion into three main groups: 1) the friendly minority, 2) the neutral majority, and 3) the
hostile minority. According to the theory, both minority groups will seek to gain the sup-
port of the neutral majority in that this group is the decisive factor for victory or defeat.
From a COIN point of view, keeping groups two and three apart is a key ingredient in
the recipe for victory, and the opposite is true for the insurgency. Furthermore, as civil-
ian casualties should be avoided, the COIN forces will have to accept the limitations of
conventional warfare and the fact that they cannot adapt the strategy of the insurgency
as its aims to create disorder where the COIN forces will be measured on their ability to
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provide security and maintain order.
According to Galula, the guiding principle should be that COIN approaches are
based on four laws that are that are centered on the previously described support of the
neutral majority of a population. Firstly, the support of the population is as necessary for
the counterinsurgency as it is for the insurgency. Controlling an area and preventing the
development of political insurgency cells requires the support and active participation
of the population. Secondly, support is gained through the active minority. All conflicts
have a minority that supports the cause which the COIN forces need to localize and or-
ganize in order to mobilizing the neutral majority. Thirdly, it is important to emphasize
that the support of the population is conditional. Finally, intensity of efforts and vast-
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ness of means are essential. Consequently, the focus of the COIN force should rather be
local and intense than national and fragile. During the implementation of the laws, it is
very important to show the population that the situation is better for the COIN forces -
and their cause is better - than for the insurgency. This is as another key principle. 6

Using Galula’s Theories in a Contemporary Conflict
Galula’s COIN Doctrine was rediscovered by the US Army in December 2006 and
was attempted implemented by means of a Field Manual. A very important question is
of course whether Galula’s theory can be used in a contemporary conflict almost four
decades after it was conceived.
The fact that Galula’s theory was written for a COIN force fighting to stay is the op-
posite of Afghanistan where the foreign COIN force (ISAF) is fighting to leave following

3 David Galula and John A Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006).
4 David Galula and John A Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006), pp. 49–52.
5 Galula makes four deductions in this law: a) effective use and show of force, politically as well as militarily,
b) political and economic reforms are useless if offered in areas where the insurgency still operates, c) an
early and convincing demonstration of will, means and ability to win, d) joining negotiations from a position
of strength only. Galula and Nagl, pp. 54-55
6 Galula and Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, pp. 52–55.