Page 115 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

755
ActA
The first step is the destruction or expulsion of the forces of the insurgency. This
objective is achieved when static units are able to garrison the area. In some areas of
the Helmand Province, this was accomplished by the expansion of the ISAF force in
2006. It is important to notice, however, that the insurgents were merely pushed into
11
rural areas and Pakistan and not eradicated altogether . Furthermore, different insurgent
groups remained in control of the rural areas of the Helmand Province which means that
the successes may be attributed to the fact that some major cities/towns were controlled
by ISAF.
The second step is the deployment of a static unit to establish a protected area with a
view to allowing political and economic development. The establishment of the British
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gar and the Danish development programs
in Gereshk indicates that such areas have been established.
12
The third step is contact with and control of the population. Here, it is vital that
13
COIN authority is established and that the insurgency is isolated from the population. In
the 2006-2010 period especially, this was attempted by means of patrolling and deploy-
ing forward operating bases. Ironically, this process was rolled back at the same time as
14
the COIN operational framework was presented as the strategic path for Afghanistan
due to the number of casualties and the fact that too few troops had been deployed. By
2013, both contact and control were limited to the cities of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk,
with no permanent military presence in Gereshk - only daytime patrols.

The fourth step deals with the destruction of the political organization of the insur-
gents by expelling their political sympathizers which has proven to be a difficult task in
Afghanistan as the Taliban does not seem to have a common political vision. Further-
more, Taliban’s scattered structure with local branches each pursuing their own agendas
15
impedes the use of a single political counter strategy. The absence of a military pres-
ence in local and remote areas of the Helmand Province is also affecting the ability to
counter the political opposition.
The fifth step deals with local elections and the installation of local leaders in posi-
tions of responsibility and power. In this phase, it is vital that COIN forces prove their
ability to maintain security in order to gaining the trust and support of the population. In

11 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan,
2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33 (2010), 567–594 (pp. 573–582) <doi:10.1080/01402390.201
0.489712>.
12 Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Dansk institut for internationale studier, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not
Sufficient (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005); Udenrigsministeriet
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), The Danish Helmand Plan 2011-2012, and Report on the Danish
Engagement in Afghanistan in 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).
13 Control should be linked to ability to protect
14 The strategy of COIN was defined both by the then ISAF Commander General McChrystal and NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan : the Liberal Disconnect
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 58–65.
15 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: a Localised Insurgency with a Local Objective’,
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21 (2010), 259–276 (pp. 262–265).