Page 114 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

754 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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the proclamation of the exit date, which leads to another problem, namely the timeframe.
Galula points out that a COIN force needs to “stay to the very end” which is difficult
when the war is optional and depends on domestic political support. According to the
COIN principles, the population needs to be convinced that the COIN forces will suc-
ceed. When the exit date was proclaimed, the mission focus changed from an objective
for progress to an objective for time which undermines the basics of the COIN theory.
Also, unification of the Afghan society has proven to be highly complex and finding a
single political cause is probably not possible which is not unique to a country in a state
of war. However, the Afghan history of the last four decades is filled with different wars
that terrorized the civilian population and created extreme conditions in terms of both
security and political stability. The nature of the propaganda aspect, and hence the pos-
8
sibility of controlling information, has also been completely changed by the evolution of
the internet and the cell phone, making unification far more complex.
Finally, there is the issue of safe havens. In Algeria, the French dealt with this by ef-
9
fectively sealing the border to Tunis which eliminated the threat from safe havens and
prevented arms smuggling to the insurgency. However, due to geography, it is not pos-
sible to seal the Afghan-Pakistani border completely.
With these caveats in mind, the theory still has a variety of elements with relevance
to the contemporary conflict in Afghanistan and the mentioning of a COIN Doctrine in
the American Field Manual provides an opportunity to view the operational framework
through the “Galula perspective.” The following analysis has two parts: focusing on the
ISAF operation in the Helmand Province in Afghanistan and further illuminating the fact
that while a COIN approach was found to be relevant and pursued implemented, the ac-
tual events proved that the ideas of Galula were not tested as a strategy in Afghanistan.

Operational Framework: The Eight Steps
10
In the description of the step framework, it says that it should be conducted se-
quentially and that analyses on each steps should not be conducted until the step has
been completed successfully. Looking at the ISAF operation through the perspective of
Galula could give you an impression of how the implementation of the COIN theory at
the strategic level influenced the actual operations.

7 With ISAF being very dependent on the American contribution, Obama’s proclamation of the American
exit-strategy was decisive for ISAF’s strategy. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan | The White House’, 2009 <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> [accessed 9
September 2013].
8 Further reading e.g.: Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan, a Modern History, Monarchy, Despotism or
Democracy?, the Problems of Governance in the Muslim Tradition, New ed. (London: IBTauris, 2005);
Artemy Kalinovsky and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Blind Leading the Blind:
Soviet Advisors, Counter-insurgency and Nation-building in Afghanistan ([Washington, D.C.]: Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010); Mohammad Yousaf, The Bear Trap, Afghanistan’s Untold
Story, 1st ed (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992).
9 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006), pp. 61–64.
10 All eight steps are described sequentially by Galula and in the following analysis; Galula´s chapter on operations
will be the point of reference. Galula and Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, pp. 75–94.