Page 117 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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areas of the Helmand Province. In the frame of reference of COIN, this was a logical
step in order to gain the support of the neutral majority. However, the focus was on the
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hostile minority and not on controlling the population. Furthermore, the decision to
set an exit date did little in terms of convincing the population that COIN would be in
control in the future. Also noteworthy in this context is the Danish duty term rotation
system – 6-month terms – which according to the COIN laws and principles is very
questionable in relation to interacting with the population.
The long-term operation was defined by the collaboration between the military and
the civilian effort. From 2010 and onwards, these operations were placed in a COIN
frame with ISAF leadership. The frame had a clear- hold-build-transfer strategy, with
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the hold element being vital in the COIN frame of reference. However, a major problem
was the absence of a single commander in chief orchestrating (or dictating) the overall
rebuilding efforts. Dividing Afghanistan between different nations each responsible for
different provinces caused difficulties for the overall rebuilding strategy as the different
ISAF nations focused on different aspects . In addition, the fixing of an exit date limited
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the hold element and had little effect in terms of persuading the population to choose to
cooperate and side with the COIN forces.

Conclusion
The COIN approach in the Helmand Province could have been successful had it been
more decisive and determined. Even though some elements have been implemented, it is
open for discussion whether the COIN approach was anything but an articulated vision
determining the ISAF strategy in Afghanistan. As shown in this analysis, Galula’s theory
was identified and pursued implemented on the level of strategy but on the operational
level, the step-by-step counterinsurgency framework was not sufficiently followed due
to some very identifiable problems.
Firstly - and most important - the core focus on the hostile minority and the friendly
minority made it difficult for the neutral majority to choose side. Secondly, the conven-
tional approach with huge military bases with manpower-demanding high tech equip-
ment alienated the majority of the population, which in turn led to the third problem:
insufficient deployment of forces, causing lack of visibility of COIN forces in relation
to the population. When a population cannot see the forces that are supposed to protect
them, they simply do not feel protected.
The formation of national and regional political parties is the fourth issue which was
not only neglected by ISAF/NATO but also thwarted by the friendly minority (with Kar-
zai at point) by means of strict regulations in relation to the establishment and organiza-
tion of political parties. The fifth problem is the decision to set an exit date which comes

20 Rynning, pp. 161–164.
21 Udenrigsministeriet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), Den danske indsats i Helmand 2010,
Helmand-planen 2010 (Udenrigsministeriet, 2010), pp. 5–13.
22 Robertus Johannes Maria Beeres, Jan van der Meulen and J Soeters, Mission Uruzgan: Collaborating in
Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2012), pp. 147–161.