Page 82 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

722 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

was necessary to stop the starvation. It was not to force political change on a war-torn
nation. The mission directive provided to U.S. commanders was specific: “selectively
disarm” any forces that were deemed hostile and remove heavy weapons and the ubiq-
uitous “technicals” or gun vehicles, but not to undertake wholesale weapons seizures.
While mass starvation as decreasing, there were some additional warning signs
on the horizon. UN diplomats did not cease to press for a more active role for the mili-
tary in Somalia to force a political settlement. However, UNITAF was a limited, peace-
keeping operation under Chapter VI of the UN charter and much of its success was due
to its limited, humanitarian goals. But while there was an uneasy truce in Somalia, there
was no peace.

Unosom II: Operation Continue Hope
While U.S. and allied forces under UNITAF maintained an uneasy calm in Somalia, a
new American administration took office in January 1993. The new Clinton administra-
tion, either out of a concern to limit the U.S. role in Somalia in a misunderstanding of
actual UN capabilities, was helping to push the United Nations into taking over the mis-
sion. This would help the United States to reduce the size of its committed forces and
handle only limited aspects of security and logistics. And on 26 March 1993, the United
Nations passed resolution 814 which considerably broadened its mandate to intervene
in another country’s affairs. The UN was now intervening militarily in a peacemaking
role under Chapter VII of its charter. The apparent goal was to make the peace by more
aggressive actions on the ground, even while undercutting the size and military effec-
tiveness of the forces that were to be employed. 8
Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir was appointed commander of the new UNOSOM II force,
with a U.S. Army Maj. Gen. as his deputy. U.S. General Thomas Montgomery also re-
tained his position as commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM) so that the
U.S. forces retained their own national chain of command while still placing themselves
under the UN structure.
9
The force envisioned by the new command was to consist of nearly 30,000 soldiers
from over 30 of nations with the largest force contingents coming from India (5,000),
Pakistan (4,500), Italy (2,500) and the U.S. (4,200).
But when the transition occurred on 4 May, only 18,000 of those peacekeepers and
a partially filled headquarters were on hand to face a vastly expanded mission and an
increasingly hostile Somalia.
10
The slow passage of Security Council Resolution 814 left all parties with little time
to plan for an orderly transition. It took time to fill the UN positions for the new force
and, by all accounts, the handover of the mission was poorly done with only 30 percent
of the UN staff in place on the date of transfer. However, despite the challenges of
11
8 R.D. Hooker, Jr., “Hard Day’s Night: A Retrospective on the American Intervention in Somalia”, Joint Forces
Quarterly, Issue 54, 3 Quarter 2009: 130. See section on Change of Mission.
rd
9 Somalia AAR, pp. 63-64 and 71.
10 Baumann and Yates, pp. 101-103 and Somalia AAR, p. 77.
11 See Somalia AAR, 71-77 for transition concerns.