Page 81 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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Because of this powerful force, the Somalis acquiesced quickly to the intervention.
The various Somali warlords, including rivals Mohammed Farah Aideed of the Habr
Gidr sub-clan and Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Abgal sub-clan, were awed by the over-
whelming force of the western allies, and agreed to move their heavy weapons and gun-
jeeps into monitored cantonment areas. The situation as described in the U.S. Army’s
After Action Report for the operation was one of “respectful coexistence” with the clan
militias keeping their weapons but also their distance from coalition forces. Thus dur-
ing the first 60 days of UNITAF’s existence, militia attacks fell sharply and massive
4
starvation was dramatically reduced. This relatively benign environment allowed mul-
tinational troops to establish protected warehouses and feeding locations, begin convoys
of relief supplies into the interior of the country, and create a more secure environment
at a number of refugee camps.
The multinational forces of UNITAF moved out from Mogadishu into the country-
side and set up eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS).
The U.S. Army forces focused on operations in four sectors—HRS Baidoa (shared
with the Australians), Balli Doggle, Merca, and Kismaayo—with the U.S. Marines oper-
ating primarily in Bardera. Other coalition forces maintained various levels of presence
in Mogadishu and some elements in the U.S. sectors, but some nations were given areas
of control of their own. Canadian forces focused heavily on Belen Uen, Italian forces
on Gialalassi, and the French on Oddur. The boundaries of these sectors remained rela-
tively constant but the shift of units and national forces into and out of these sectors
5
varied greatly.)
By the end of Operation UNITAF on 4 May 1993, it seemed as if the crisis was all
but over. The country was quiet. Starvation was reduced. Food supplies flowed freely.
The presence of 39,000 coalition forces strong, nearly 29,000 of which were U.S. troops,
was enough to establish a measure of peace. That overwhelming force was able to halt
the violence and distribute hundreds of thousands of tons of food and relief supplies
6
throughout the southern half of the country. This was all to change.
The first warning signs of what became a textbook case of “mission creep” occurred
as early as 11 December, just as the UNITAF forces were moving into Somalia. UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali called U.S. President George H.W. Bush and
insisted that the only way the operation would be successful was for the coalition troops
to completely disarm the various Somali factions, not simply move their heavy weapons
into Somali-controlled cantonments. President Bush strongly disagreed and considered
that any such move against the still-powerful and well-armed warlords would instantly
7
lead to open warfare. The mission, in his mind, was to remain focused on doing what

4 Somalia Working Group, United States, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United
States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003, p. 26.
(Hereafter referred to as the Somalia AAR.)
5 Stewart, p. 8.
6 Somalia AAR, p. 26.
7 Baumann and Yates, pp. 35-36. The phrase “’Selective disarming’ as necessary” was apparently coined by
Central Command Commander, marine General Joseph Hoar.