Page 79 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II
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719
          ActA
          UNITAF and UNOSOM II:  The Failure of Multinational
          Operations in Somalia 1992-1994



          Richard W. STEWART



              t is impossible to discuss the failed mission in Somalia in the early 1990s, twenty
          I years ago now, in terms of one operation or one decision or even one reason for
          failure.  It was a highly complex military and political operation which, in the course of
          three years took a number of dramatic twists and turns worthy of a soap opera, albeit one
          with deadly consequences for hundreds. 1
             The story of the failure to assist in saving Somalia from itself is a complicated one.  It
          is made more difficult given the fact that the political and military conditions in Somalia
          changed so often that in the space of less than five years in the early 90s one can make
          out no fewer than eight distinct operational phases or sub-phases to the various United
          Nations and multi-national operations that tried to deal with the deteriorating situation.
          These phases were, in fact, so different as to almost constitute distinct and separate mili-
          tary actions.  These operations, listed here were: Operation UNOSOM I (United Nations
          Operations in Somalia) from Apr. to Aug. 1992; U.S. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF
          (a humanitarian airlift operation with some special operations support run solely by
          the U.S.) from Aug.-Dec. 1992; UNITAF or Unified Task Force ( U.S. Operation RE-
          STORE HOPE) involving the deployment of a U.S.-led multinational force supported
          by a UN from Dec. 1992 to May 1993; a renewed United Nations mission in Somalia
          called Operation UNOSOM II starting in May 1993 lasting until March 1995; (the U.S.
          sub-operation called CONTINUE HOPE until Mar 1994); GOTHIC SERPENT, a con-
          current sub-operation of U.S. Task Force Ranger from Aug. to Oct. 1993 culminating
          in the “Blackhawk Down” raid of 3-4 October 1993; the U.S. military reinforcement,
          under strict rules of engagement in support of UNOSOM II operations from Oct. 1993 to
          March 1994 called JTF Somalia; and UNITED SHIELD, the U.S. name of the operation
          that assisted in the final withdrawal of all U.N. personnel from Somalia over the next
          year ending in March 1995.
             Each of these operations or phases constitute a distinct, although related, story with
          different actors, shifting political alliances, varied UN and U.S. interests and resolutions,
          and very different outcomes.  For the purposes of this paper, and in consonance with the
          theme of this Congress of joint and multinational operations, I propose to focus on the
          middle, and in my mind most critical, period in the story of the multinational engage-
          ment in Somalia from late 1992 to early 1994.  The greatest chance of success in the
          mission of ending famine in Somalia and crafting some form of political settlement was
          in this middle period.
             One of the critical facts in understanding the situation in Somalia in the 1990s, is
          1    This paper reflects only my own opinion and does not represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense,
             the U.S. Army or the U.S. government.
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