Page 295 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE 1866 CAMPAIGN 277

From the story of the events one gets a series of detailed episodes appar-
ently disconnected from each other where even the most important
(Bezzecca) does not seem to take a central part in the general scope of the
operations; it is necessary to see in this a direct consequence of those negative
factors mentioned earlier.
Then, in the word “I obey” contained in Garibaldi’s telegram of 9 th
August (to which corresponds, clearly, the “It will be done” in the telegram
of the same 9 th August by general Medici) one should not see only an act of
discipline, however high and very significant, but also the outburst of a sol-
dier, with a great heart, that when the mission has ended, but not complet-
ed, betrays – and only then – the internal tension that had been kept silent
for two months.
And maybe it is in this light that the moral greatness of Garibaldi emerges
more clearly, that he could keep in check all passions, when the homeland
called, could act when no one was telling him how to act, and carried out a
task made very difficult by the enemy, the terrain, and the means available.
The temerity he demonstrated at Suello Mountain and Bezzecca, shows
how he felt; his contemptuous return to Caprera – after the campaign – says
more than the word “I obey”.
The very exaggerated fame of his adversary, General Kuhn, also had a neg-
ative effect on Garibaldi.
Kuhn had a good knowledge of mountain war; he had troops that were
trained and familiar with that particular form of war; he had available forts
and well placed magazines, and he was favoured by the terrain that in the area
of Trento allowed him to move rapidly, along the natural depressions and
good communication, through those mountain ranges and valleys parallel to
each other, that on the other side of the border were separating elements for
the Italians.
In reality, Even Kuhn demonstrated how his method, good in a defensive
mode when it was connected with the whole mechanism of defence forts and
magazines, was less effective when shifting to offensive where improvisation-
al astuteness was needed.
The idea of operating in Tirol was not new; already in 1848 the Lombard
volunteers had arrived as far as the Giudicarie, almost to Trento; in 1858, on
the other hand, this action had been considered but rejected in order not to
violate Tirol that was part of the Germanic Confederation.