Page 300 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version
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282                     GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI



            were badly dressed, badly armed, with improvised and poor logistic services.
               They scarcely lent themselves to regular war operations, particularly endur-
            ing and large scale ones: the only possible manoeuvre was to go forward. They
            could achieve better results, from the distinct initiative abilities and personal
            prestige of the better elements, in small operations and even in guerrilla
            action, as was the case in the Viterbo area. Garibaldi’s bands that were operat-
            ing in the north and south of the Roman territory – particularly the first – in
            fact kept the Papal troops very busy forcing them to scatter in all directions,
            resulting in their getting tired and dividing. But this was a tactic that required
            time and means that were lacking thus it was necessary to hasten to prevent
            the expected French intervention and the ensuing interference of the Italian
            government and avoid further damage to the national cause.
               In these conditions and keeping as many enemy’s forces as possible busy
            in the Area of Viterbo and the province of Frosinone, for Garibaldi the most
            rational way to act with the means at his disposal was to aim with energy and
            decision for the shortest way to Rome, and, counting on surprise, to take the
            city with the help of the prepared people’s internal insurrection that would
            lead to a rapid and victorious campaign.
               The boldness of the leader, his personal prestige and the encouragement
            that he was able to give to the operations of his volunteers, gave a legitimate
            hope of success in the bold enterprise. Maybe the memory of the miraculous
            conquest of Palermo in 1860 crossed the mind of the captain, but unlike
            then, in 1867 he was confronted by the excellent French troops, and the well
            trained troops of the Papal army, the almost total indifference of the Roman
            population and enemy generals that proved to be very different from the old
            and unfit Bourbon leaders. His plan then failed and the campaign met a trag-
            ic but not inglorious end in Mentana.




            OPERATIONS
               Garibaldi, escapes from Caprera on the 22 nd  of October and goes to
            Florence where he addresses the people in Piazza S. Maria Novella.
               He speaks to the King, with Rattazzi and Cialdini. Leaves for Terni, on the
            morning of the 23 rd  is in Rieti where he speaks to the people from the bal-
            cony of Palazzo Vicentini; at dawn of the 24 th  he is on the other side of the
            border in Passo Corese.
               Since the 22 nd  Garibaldi had given orders to gather the volunteers
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