Page 297 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE 1866 CAMPAIGN 279

with the aim of “penetrating the valley of the Adige and to settle there in a
way that would block any communication between the Tirol and the
Austrian Armada in Italy”.
To highlight the figure of Garibaldi during this campaign it seems then
opportune to examine the concept he had of his task and the subsequent evo-
lution of the original idea to adapt to the present needs.
In accordance with the orders received, Garibaldi for the time being had
to limit himself to carry out a cover along the border, from the Valtellina to
lake Garda, since his Corps was far from complete.
No clearer directives were given by general La Marmora on the 25 th June,
th
after the unlucky day in Customary (June 24 ), so that again Garibaldi was
induced to remain on the defensive, in order to protect also Brescia, as he was
expressly ordered to do.
st
It was only on the 1 of July that he passes on the offensive and – as one
can evince from the official report – by his own initiative; and he moves per-
fectly organised within the concept of safety; he advances then, with the bulk
of his forces, suitably staggered, towards the Caffaro; places a garrison, on the
right side of the coast of lake Garda and protects himself on the left by send-
ing a detachment to Valcamonica. And, despite this, a very daring idea, as the
volunteers corps, still very dispersed, are going to face a critical time between
the 29 th June and 5 th July, due to the uncertainty about the intentions of the
enemy who has two masses, one strong and victorious moving between the
Mincio and the Chiese and therefore at the back of Garibaldi, the other in
the front in the valleys of Trentino.
The ideas of general Garibaldi were therefore clear and so were the
instructions he gave; the execution on the other hand was very defective.
The detachments were not amalgamated: their commands were impro-
vised; this resulted in poor tactics clearly manifested since the first skirmishes.
Mountain battles require preparation, long training, method; what hap-
pened instead was that exploration was neglected, the march of the columns
at the bottom of the valley was hurried, without waiting for the result of the
actions of the columns flanking from above; the subordinate leaders were
unable to integrate the directive received into their area of action. This meant
that a high price in blood was paid for the first less than brilliant successes;
in which faith and impulse took the place of art.
Garibaldi had to adapt to a stop: the lack of supplies, the excessive size of
that mixed corps, the formation of the detachments, far too heavy, required