Page 298 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

280 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

good orders and dispositions that were now compelling since they had not
been taken care of earlier. But this is not all, the offensive raids that Kuhn car-
ried out in Valtellina and in Valcamonica, suggested prudence; they truly had
no effect on the overall operations, nor could particularly the one in
Valtellina that was too eccentric; however, the troops that had been deployed
there with the mandate to defend the high Valtellina, joining the left of the
volunteers in Valcamonica, had gone too far back for Garibaldi not to worry
about his exposed side.
This was a critical period of short duration, since Garibaldi’s orders arrived
even now in time to correct the situation; So that on the 8 th July he resumed
the advance. He wanted to make safe his right side by taking control of the
Val di Ledro, and then continue towards Tione in Val Giudicaria and from
here to Trento. In the real situation there were various setbacks that forced
him to stop again, particularly because he felt the need to diminish the depth
of the bulk of his forces, that is to gather them together and this because once
again the central column at the bottom of the valley had exceeded the wings.
And so the poor organisation of the volunteers and poor professionalism
of the subaltern leaders that were no longer those of Calatafimi and Volturno,
had an effect for the second time, on the operation in Trentino. In fact that
would have been the right moment to take decisive actions on Trento, the
moment when Garibaldi’s task would have had the outmost importance.
In fact, exactly on the 7 th July, General Cialdini had started crossing the
Po, and on the 17 th July the Austrian quadrilateral could have been cut off
from direct communication with Vienna and only connected with it through
the Tirol.
Only on the 21 st July, after repelling an attempted offensive by Kuhn
(Cimego and Condino, 16 th July) and by opportunely protecting his sides,
Garibaldi could move: but he was modifying his original plan; he would no
longer proceed through the Giudicarie, but through the Val di Ledro. He was
then quickly adapting his strategy to the needs of the moment: to respond
more quickly to the action that Cialdini was attempting on Trento sending
the division of General Medici up to the Valsugana.
The armistice of the 15 th July, followed on the 9 th August by the order
to retreat this side of the border, cut short the campaign when in fact - had
“political considerations” not intervened – it would have reached its aim glo-
riously.