Page 296 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

278 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

After that campaign, at first the concept prevailed that – in a new and
expected war – it was more convenient to take a defensive stance, appointing
the volunteers for the defence of the Trentino border.
Later on though, the opposite concept was asserting itself: to act by offen-
sive action, that is with the bulk of the army, or from the Mincio as some sug-
gested, or from the lower Po, according to others; in any case, an offensive
action also in the Tirol, to be carried out by the volunteers. The task that
would have been given to the volunteers then would have been very differ-
ent, depending on the plan adopted: an action designed to flank the army, if
acting from the Mincio; but an action decisively aimed at cutting the enemy’s
line of communication in the Tirol if the regular army was to attack from the
lower Po. But at the outbreak of hostilities, the known disagreements
between general La Marmora and Cialdini on how to conduct the operations
were clear, and as a result also indecisions on the task to be given to the vol-
unteers on the Tirol; Indecisions that obviously affected Garibaldi’s decisions,
not knowing weather the regular army was going to attack from the Mincio
or the Lower Po.
The lack of clear ideas on the possible actions in Trentino, also affected,
which is much more serious, the organisation itself of the volunteers Corps,
in the sense that there was a failure to determine precisely what kind of
organic development was to be taken by his units. Therefore the arrange-
ments taken with regard to the formation in cadres, the equipment and the
services were not suited to the needs. Not only, but all the supplying of pro-
visions was granted to private enterprises, that were also in charge of the dis-
tribution to the various detachments; and since no advanced magazines had
been set up, apart from one in Brescia, which is much further back, getting
supplies was difficult; not the ultimate cause of the difficulties encountered
later in moving a large Corps in a mountainous area; and it was also not the
ultimate cause of the surprise element for the enemy being missed since this,
being aware of it, learned that the bulk of the volunteers would have acted
along the Val Giudicaria.
To add to the uncertainties, the head of General Staff of the army, gener-
al La Marmora, on the 19 th of June told Garibaldi that he was entrusting
him “from this moment with the defence of Lake Garda and the various pass-
es that from the Tirol lead to the Lombard valley” and that, with the outbreak
of hostilities, while the volunteers were getting together in terms of numbers
and organisation, Garibaldi was to act “through the lake or the mountains”