Page 104 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

5.6 THE BATTLES OF SOLSTICE AND VITTORIO VENETO

oPeraTIonal aPPraIsals before The lasT ausTro-hungarIan aTTack

With regards to operations in January 1918, the Intelligence Office confirmed the rumours about
the withdrawal of the German forces from Italy, which induced the Supreme Command to resume
the initiative with the Battle of the Three Mountains, with the purpose of showing the enemy that
the Italian army had recovered its offensive capabilities.
In March and April, preparations for a large-scale Austro-Hungarian offensive were detected, with no
German support and with no certainties as to the direction and the date of the attack. On 28 May 1918
general Diaz wrote to the French General Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces:

The news collected over the last days and coming from both diplomatic sources and the
questioning of prisoners and deserters, leaves no room for doubt about the enemy’s intention
to develop, as soon as weather conditions allow it, a large-scale attack on the front of the
Piave River. This should be supported by another forceful attack in the mountains, which
should involve the Mount Grappa region and the Asiago Plateau. This information is frequent,
consistent and confirmed by other provided by our officers who have recently returned from
imprisonment .
61
According to a telegram the Operations Office sent to the Ministry of War on 9 June: “prisoners
and deserters agree on affirming that a large-scale enemy offensive is in an advanced state of
preparation. The deployment of artillery seems to be complete and the reserve units appear to be
advancing to reach the proximity of the front lines” .
62
The enemy preparation was followed in any detail:

In early June, (Austro-Hungarian, A/N) companies on the front line received food supplies
and reserve ammunition to be distributed to troops before the offensive. At the same time,
soldiers had to return their second blanket and set of underwear; all superfluous material was
removed from the front line. Approximately on 7 June, troops in the front line started to get
better and richer meals, and non-essential goods were largely distributed. At nights, between
7 and 11 June, assault battalions were sent to their positions. It was only on 4 June that news
spread about the enemy command’s decision to begin the offensive around mid-June. Later,
it was possible to specify that the enemy would attack on 15 June, in the morning. On 14
June it was certain that the enemy would start preparatory artillery fire at 3 of the following
day. […] The enemy had tried to hide its intentions by starting preparations quite in advance
to have them completed, more than one month before the action, by keeping its plans secret
and by changing them. Yet, it was possible to have timely knowledge of its assets and predict
the day and time of the offensive. […] At 3 on 15 June enemy preparation fire began. At 3.05
counter-preparation fire began .
63

61 Supreme Headquarters - Operation Office, letter no.11030, 28 May 1918, Situazione militare sulla fronte italiana (Military
situation on the Italian front), AUSSME, Series E-2. Important information had come from the questioning of a pilot shot
down during a reconnaissance flight to film the fortification around Treviso and some sectors of the Piave River near Ponte
della Priula (Supreme Headquarters - Operations Office, Memorandum of 18 May 1918, AUSSME, Series E-2).
62 Telegram no.15907, 9 June 1918 of the Supreme Headquarters - Operations Office, AUSSME, Series E-2.
th
63 4 Army Headquarters - Operational Unit Intelligence Office, Memorandum no. 4363, 26 July 1918, Relazione riassuntiva
sull’offensiva svolta dal nemico sulla fronte dell’Armata, 14 giugno - 5 luglio 1918, (Summary report of the offensive

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