Page 105 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FIVE

The Intelligence Office, on the base of telephone eavesdropping and statements of last-minute
deserters, specified the exact time for the attack, thus allowing Italian artillery, in some sectors of
the front, to forestall enemy preparation and block enemy infantries at their starting bases.
Following the seizure of a considerable number of documents during the Battle of the Solstice, the
Intelligence Office of the 3 Army translated and comprised them into a collection called Servizio
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informazioni presso l’esercito A.U (Intelligence Service within the Austro-Hungarian Army) .
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The PreParaTIon of The fInal baTTle
After the Battle of the Solstice, the Intelligence Office grasped the deep political and economic
crisis affecting the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in late summer of 1918 suggested a general
offensive on the Italian front that might become decisive.
It also predicted the collapse of Bulgaria following the offensive carried out by the Allies on the
Macedonian front on 15 September. During the first half of October, movement of enemy units
towards the Balkan front were detected. From 17 October, the progressive internal collapse of
Austria become evident because of increasing number of deserters in the Army, even not coming
from the front line.
Immediately before the decisive Italian attack, it was disclosed that:

the pressure of political events in Austria has shown an impact also on the Army. Higher
commands consistently report that among units, and especially in the rear lines, a negative
feeling is broadening that could have serious consequences on the combativeness and the
fighting efficiency of the Army. Especially among troops far from the front lines a belief has
spread that the war is now over, and that going back home is a matter of just a few weeks.
An alarming lack of discipline prevails everywhere and is apparently gaining more and more
ground […]. It is possible to say with absolute certainty that, as regards troops in the rear lines,
the soldiers’ morale is seriously affected. In our opinion, with difficulty and not anytime soon
can these soldiers be brought to combat. Cases of indiscipline among soldiers of oppressed
nationalities are countless .
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When the Battle of Vittorio Veneto was imminent, thanks to the radio communications interceptions
which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters, the Intelligence Office of the 4 Army
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warned its own Headquarters that the Austro-Hungarians were waiting for an Italian attack at any
time.

aIr and sPecIal forces on The eneMy rear lInes

Since 1915, the Intelligence Offices of the Armies had also been dealing with the planning of
reconnaissance aircraft mission and observations from balloons. Along the war, the aircraft
surveillance flights to pinpoint the enemy’s defensive posts and watch over its rear lines and vital
centres, became more paying than ground observation and photographs.

launched by the enemy along the front of the Army, 14 June - 5 July 1918), AUSSME, Series F-2.
64 For security reasons the documents were printed and disseminated only in 1920 as folder no.8 of the collection La battaglia
del Piave dal 15 al 24 giugno 1918.
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65 3 Army Headquarters – Intelligence Office, Memorandum, 30 October 1918, Movimenti di truppe e notizie dal Trentino
e dal Tirolo - notizie avute dall’ufficio informazioni della 1ª Armata (Movements of Troops and News from Trentino and
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Tyrol - news from the Intelligence Office of the 1 Army), AUSSME, Series, E-1.

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