Page 119 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)
P. 119

CHAPTER SIX




                  COMINT relies on several means corresponding to specific phases in the process of information
                  collection from enemy transmissions. The most important ones are:
                     – interception, namely find out, copying and recording enemy dispatches;
                     – traffic analysis, namely studying intercepted traffic to get information, even without interpreting
                     the meaning of messages;
                     – interpretation of intercepted dispatches, which includes the cryptology analysis.
                  A full efficacy of Communication Intelligence can be achieved by mean of a close synergy between
                  the three sectors just mentioned: interception, traffic analysis, and cryptologic operations.
                  A further form of attack on enemy communications, which is somehow alternative to interception,
                  consists of interference to the point of complete communication interdiction, a technique that
                  is now called jamming. Radio interference was systematically used also on the Italian-Austrian
                  front, for instance to prevent enemy reconnaissance aircrafts from transmitting to ground stations
                  information that could be useful in aiming enemy artillery against one’s lines or in disclosing the
                  positions and movements of troops.
                  During the war, French military experts submitted to the Allied Radiotelegraphic Committee a
                  radio interference plan to be implemented against the international radio connections of the Central
                  Powers. The plan was rejected due to opposition by the British, who thought that interception
                  would be more fruitful than interdiction of enemy communications .
                                                                                17
                  Telecommunications, both radio and telephone, were frequently employed for various forms
                  of deception. The Austrian Army attempted radio deception during some phases of the war
                  by  increasing  the  intensity  of  radio  traffic  in  areas  other  than  the  ones  where  attacks  were
                  being prepared. Moreover, on several occasions the Italian and the Austrian tried to deceive
                  one another by false phonograms or mere telephone conversations that seemed real and could
                  be easily interpreted by the enemy. For avoiding the dangers of deception, the data gathered
                  through interception, decryption and/or interpretation, must be validated by comparison with
                  other information.
                  To defend their telecommunications from attacks, all armies adopted defensive measures that can
                  now be globally considered as pertaining to Communication Security or COMSEC which includes
                  the physical defence of equipment and material integrity, as well as the protection of transmission
                  channels and carried messages.
                  The following paragraph briefly describes the offensive and defensive methods used during the
                  WWI in the domain of telephone and radiotelegraph communications.



                  TelePhone eavesdroPPIng
                  The mass telephone interception carried out during the WWI along the land front lines, resulted
                  as an important source of information for Intelligence. As soon as the war broke out, all armies
                  realised that they could listen to enemy conversations through their own ordinary telephones. They
                  immediately profited from this opportunity creating more adequate high-sensitivity devices and
                  organizing specialized services to carry out systematic eavesdropping operations.
                  Most interception did not happen by tapping or direct insertion into enemy connections but mainly
                  by telephone lines installed in favourable positions with respect to the enemy lines, exploiting the
                  combined effect of ground conductivity and electromagnetic induction.
                  Since field telephones were largely used, Intelligence could rely on information more relevant in
                  terms of quantity, but of different nature than that collected through Radio Intelligence. In fact, the


                  17  F. Cartier, Souvenirs, op.cit., No. 85, p.35.


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