Page 120 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)
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THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)




              range of telephone interception systems amounted to very few kilometres, so that the intercepted
              communications directly came from front line units and usually had a short-term operational
              relevance. Yet, this kind of activity could in many cases provide interesting results also from a
              strategic point of view. Ronge himself acknowledges that “listening (to telephone conversations)
              was actually more important for local news. However, it provided valuable data also for higher-
              level directives and could be useful to monitor deserters’ statements.” The last part of the sentence
              regards the false deserters sent by the Italians to provide the enemy with fake news .
                                                                                          18


              radIo InTercePTIon and TraffIc analysIs
              The immaturity of radio techniques available at the beginning of the war led to many drawbacks,
              including high sensitivity to atmospheric disturbances, to interference generated by the enemy or
              friendly transmissions and, above all, exposure to interception.
              To exploit this last weakness, opposed armies produced large and continuous efforts to improve
              their  own organizations  committed  to listening  activities, in terms of quantity  and quality  of
              resources. They developed, for instance, more and more advanced systems to intercept, select,
              and classify enemy radio stations according to their main characteristics .
                                                                                19
              However, one should not underestimate the difficulty inherent in interception operations due to
              the simultaneous presence of many transmitters belonging to friendly, enemy, or neutral parties
              and using the same radio wavelengths. Difficulty was also generated by the previously mentioned
              disturbances that sometime made reception uncertain, not only for stations to which dispatches
              were directed but also for intercepting stations.
              Finally,  to  intrude  effectively  on  enemy  communication  flows,  intercepting  stations  must  be
              positioned on the front line - although in locations not as forward as telephone listening stations
              - and advanced as the transmitted power of enemy stations decreased. Therefore, their physical
              integrity must be secured reducing, as far as possible, the vulnerability of intercepting posts and of
              their connections with data primary processing centres: usually telephone or telegraph lines prone
              to be interrupted by enemy artillery fire, adverse weather conditions, etc.
              The expression traffic analysis dates to many years after WWI though the activities belonging to
              that category were already being extensively carried out during the war. The analysis of traffic
              generated by enemy stations entailed studying intercepted signals to mainly identify:
                 – their power and wavelength;
                 – frequency and periodicity of communications;
                 – nature and length of dispatches;
                 – time of transmission;
                 – positions of transmitters by means of radio location devices.
              To  understand  the  usefulness  of  traffic  analysis,  it  is  enough  to  think  that  simply  counting
              radiograms daily emitted by the enemy is a significant indication of its activity, which usually
              increases before the beginning of large operations. In addition, the frequency and addressees of
              dispatches help outline the structure of communications networks and therefore the hierarchy of
              enemy organization.






              18  M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p.228.
              19  At the beginning of every dispatch, the transmitting station generally specifies its own names and the name of the receiving
              station(s), consisting of a limited number of letters and figures.


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