Page 147 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER SEVEN

up the interpretation of a large quantity of intercepted telegrams, Ronge set up a decryption service
(Dechiffrierdienst) initially comprising just one person, the above-mentioned Captain Andrea Figl,
who mastered the Italian language and “until the end of the war, with the exception of brief periods,
worked within the decrypting service against Italy, developing undeniable expertise in this field” .
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Moreover, Ronge tried to get as many Italian codes as possible, to facilitate decrypting of the
intercepted radio dispatches piling up in the archives.
Finally, after August 1914 Austro-Hungarian analysts had joined Russian and Balkan fronts,
developing a considerable experience in breaking enemy field ciphers, which proved useful in
order to decrypt Italian dispatches.
In August 1914, the Austro-Hungarians army was equipped with 13 fixed transmitting and
receiving stations and 13 field stations, assigned to the Supreme Command (AOK) and to the
Armies’ Headquarters. Later they acquired low power equipment easily transportable on difficult
terrains, such as mountain areas, utilizing 11 of them on the Italian front for interception purposes
since November 1915 . Being convinced that listening to enemy radio communications would
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lead to considerable competitive advantage, the Austro-Hungarian used their radio resources more
to intercept enemy communications than for communicating between units of their own army.

ITalIan Troubles

Right before the war, the Italian
Supreme Command was aware of
the importance to intercept Austro-
Hungarian radio communications,
as shown by the correspondence
that the Headquarters of the
General Staff Corps sent to the
Mobilization Office in August
1914, to request that “the fixed
radio stations of Treviso, Arsiero,
Primolano, Pieve di Cadore and
Osoppo” be mainly dedicated to
a “convenient listening service
by intercepting radiotelegraphic
communications”. The interest of
General Cadorna in immediately
launching this activity is
demonstrated by a telegram
(picture 7.8) which urged to
deploy the required personnel to
manage those stations . 7.8 Request by General Cadorna to initiate the radio interception
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service at the Eastern border
However, contrary to what
happened in the Austrian army,
the Italian General Staff Corps

34 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit. p. 178.
35 M. Ronge, Die Radiohorch, op. cit. p.1 - 2.
36 AUSSME, Series F3, env.52.

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