Page 148 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)
P. 148

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)




              did not create a specific organization to decrypt dispatches even though the tasks assigned to the
              Intelligence Office in April 1915 included the the decryption - when possible - of documents taken
              from the enemy . Poor cryptographic knowledge of the entire intelligence sector clearly emerged
                            37
              during the first months of war, when no officer of this sector managed to decrypt any enemy’s
              encoded dispatches.
              As a partial justification of the Italian Army’s lack of cryptologic knowledge, the insufficient
              culture of the whole Country in this domain could be mentioned. According to David Kahn,
              “Italy was about as interested in cryptology as it was in say, social reforms” . Nevertheless he
                                                                                      38
              acknowledges that at that time most other European Armies took part in the same “parade of
              cryptologic ignorance”, even though some of them, namely the French, the Austrian and partly
              the Russian army were more prepared than others in this field. In fact, before the war, “there was
              no organized military cryptanalytic bureau in any country, except France and Austria-Hungary” .
                                                                                                     39
              The same inadequacy concerns the preparation of the codes and ciphers of the Italian army. Under
              the regulations in force, their creation was not a responsibility of the Intelligence Office which
              had only to select the keys, as the existing ciphers were perhaps considered sufficient or because
              the creation of new ciphers could presumably be assigned to another organization, which did not
              actually exist.




              7.5  MOBILIZATION CODES AND CIPHERS

              As for most other Armies, two kinds of large diffusion cryptographic systems were in service at the
              mobilization of the Italian Army, respectively for communications among high level Headquarters
              and for communications with and between minor units.
              Within the first category, after the war in Libya three codes had been used meeting different levels
              of secrecy, depending on their dissemination: the fewer copies printed and distributed the higher the
              level of secrecy achieved. The Red Code - also called the Red cover book - considerably widespread
              had the lowest level of confidentiality, while the Blue Code used for reserved communications was
              considered more secret. An even higher level of secrecy belonged to the Green Code reserved for
              strictly secret telegrams.
              The mobilization ciphers list included the Pocket Military Cipher for communications between
              subordinate units.
              Moreover, the radiotelegraphic sections of the Supreme Command of the Armies and of Cavalry
              Units had a Service Cipher applied not only for coding service communications between radio
              stations, but also to encode and decode dispatches originated by Headquarters.
              The following paragraphs describe the structure of the two most common mobilization systems,
              namely the Red Code and the Pocket Military Cipher. Other codes available during the mobilization
              phase as well as the Service Ciphers will be discussed in the following chapter.








              37   Norme  generali  per  la  costituzione  e  il  funzionamento  del  Comando  Supremo  Unificato  (General  Rules  for creation
              and  functioning  of  the  Unified  Supreme  Headquarters),  AUSSME,  Series  L3,  env.48;  M.  G.  Pasqualini,  Carte  segrete
              dell’Intelligence italiana, Parte quinta, dal 1914 al 1918, p. 258.
              38  D. Kahn, op. cit., p. 263.
              39  ibidem.


                146
   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153