Page 163 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER EIGHT

Ronge specifies that the seizure of an Italian manual regarding the wartime use of radio “comprising
all necessary data, both technical and practical, about its structure and functioning” occurred right
after the 12 August and points out that, following this event, “the number of decoded telegrams
peaked to 50 and not infrequently to 70 a day”. Possessing the manual substantially determines a
breakthrough in terms of quantity and probably quality of decryption .
28
On the contrary, Figl does not mention any circumstance that could have facilitated the decryption
process, perhaps fearing to diminish his own merits, which were in any case undeniable. This
doesn’t, in any way, attenuate the serious mistake of partial ciphering, nor does it lessen the evident
weakness of the first service ciphers.
As regards mobilization code, the Pocket Military began to be employed in mid-June, along with
the distribution of the first keys . However, Ronge’s memoirs point out that only in October 1915
29
the Austrians started intercepting a few dispatches encoded with the Pocket Military, which proves
its rare use for radio communications. Of course, the Austrian could easily decrypt them just by
finding out the short and simple keys, by one of the already mentioned methods .
30
Furthermore, according to Austrian sources, the first dispatch coded with the Red Book was
intercepted and decrypted during the First Battle of the Isonzo, precisely on 5 July . This version
31
does not tally with the actual development of the facts, because the radiogram in question was not
transmitted on 5 but on 25 July 1915, and presumably was not ciphered with the Red Code.

a flaw In The ausTrIan MeMoIrs
Figl quotes the following radio dispatch intercepted by the Austrian stations on the 5 ofJuly:
th

2 Army Headquarters. By standing on the Medea Hill, His Excellency the Chief of the Army
nd
Staff, observes that 2 Army demonstration is not carried out as vigorously as needed to
nd
facilitate the difficult action of the 3 Army. General Porro .
rd
32
A copy of the original radiogram shown in picture 8.4 shows the differences compared to radiogram
reported by Figl probably due to translation issues or some difficulty in reception. However, the
most remarkable discrepancy between the two version of telegram is the date: the 29 of July
th
of the telegram in the picture is significantly later than the 5 of July when, according to the
th
Austrians, the telegram was intercepted, so that it could be investigated the reason why the Medea
radiotelegraphic station produced a copy of a telegram transmitted so many days before.
Let’s to proceed in order. The Medea hill - approximately 20 kilometres west of Gorizia - despite
being only 140 metres above sea level, provided a suitable post to control part of the Isonzo
front. In fact, King Vittorio Emanuele III, General Cadorna, and the 3 Army Headquarters used
rd
it as a lookout. Not far from there, the 3 Army had installed one of the 3KW truck-mounted
rd

an amount of 70 of them in just one day. Moreover, 12 August is the date in which, according to Figl, the second key to the
service cipher was applied (O. H. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas Figl, op. cit., p. 98 - 99). Actually, this happened on 20 August,
by a service order dated 13 August.
28 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p. 177. In the previous period, from 21 June to 12 August, telegrams interpreted every day
would amount to less than one.
29 Royal Italian Army, Supreme Headquarters, Extremely confidential circular No. 960 of 17 June 1915, Key to the Pocket
Military Cipher.
30 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op cit., p.5.
31 O. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas, op cit., p. 97. The news was reported in M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p. 177 and in M.
Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op cit., p.3.
32 O. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas, op cit., p. 97.

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