Page 309 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

encoding, with the purpose of using only the first page of the code instead of searching for these
words in the following pages .
39
However, in the author’s opinion, the Headquarters of the Austro-Hungarian Radiotelegraphic
Service were equally at fault, as they adopted a two-parts code, regardless of its expected ‘life
span’. Sacco himself admitted that “the widespread two-part but not over-encoded books made
of a thousand entries could not resist the efforts of crypto-analysts but for a few days or weeks,
depending on the larger or smaller traffic volume” .
40

radIo coMMunIcaTIons In The second baTTle of The PIave rIver
After a radio silence observed before the battle inception, as soon as the Austrian attack began,
the Italians resumed radio communications too, although in controlled and limited mode, adopting
countermeasures to avoid the enemy could intercept useful information by radio. They heavily
relied on landlines and used wireless communications only when indispensable, such as to receive
information from aircraft. The Chief Inspector of the STM acknowledged that:

Radiotelegraphy also provided a constant link between the ground and the air, where our
countless, daring aircrafts could signal our artillery the enemy targets in the esplanade
covered by the ‘Piave’. Quick radiotelegraphic reports about inbound enemy aircraft, [...]
scrambled swarms of our brave aircraft towards the reported locations. These events explain
how radiotelegraphy made an active contribution to our numerous and splendid victories in
the air .
41

The encoding and decoding tables and over-encoding were frequently changed. The keys of the
CFbis service cipher were replaced on the 16 , 18 and then again on the 23 of June, so much so
th
th
rd
that during little more than a month there were about ten changes. On 5 August, a completely new
service code known as SB was introduced, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Ronge himself recognised “the difficulties connected with the different systems introduced by
the Italians”, even though he maintained that “the radiotelegraphic interception service supported
the Headquarters very well” . Figl, on the other hand, only recalled some cryptograms decrypted
42
on the first day of the fighting and said nothing about the events of the cryptographic battle that
followed. According to him, that battle cost resulted to be much higher than 200,000+ dead, injured,
or missing people in the Austro-Hungarian ranks, since its disappointing conclusion caused the
loss of people’ trust in the Army and represented the decisive turning point in the course of the
war, that is, the beginning of the end of the Hapsburg Empire .
43

39 L. Sacco, op. cit., p. 234.
40 ibidem.
41 Chief Inspector, STM, Relazione sul Servizio Telegrafico, Telefonico, Ottico e Radiotelegrafico durante l’offensiva austriaca
del Giugno 1918, (Report on Telegraphic, Telephonic, Optical and Radio telegraphic Services during June 1918 Austrian
attack), ISCAG, Coll. 232.
42 M Ronge, Spionaggio, p.333 - 334.
43 O.J. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas Figl, op. cit., p. 211 - 213.

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