Page 312 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

13.5 TELEPHONE EAVESDROPPING ACROSS THE PIAVE FRONT

TelePhone InTercePTIon efforTs

The shorter front resulting from the shift from the Isonzo to the Piave, together with the difficulty
of installing earth sockets on the other bank of the river, led to a reduction in the number of the
Italian listening stations, which became 21 in January 1918 and increased to 28 in October of the
same year, as shown by the radio telegraphic maps. However, according to the Inspectorate of the
STM, the number of telephone listening stations operating in October 1918 was higher than those
reaching the number of 63 in October, as it included besides the fixed, also the mobile stations,
equipped with cabins and systems that could be easily disassembled and redeployed along the
Piave front .
52
A letter from General Caviglia, the Commander of the 8 Army, showed the difficulty of picking
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up enemy conversations along the Piave. He referred to some unsuccessful attempts of crossing
the river to install earth sockets . However, in other cases, such attempts were successful, as the
53
vivid description of Guasco proves:

Because of the characteristics of the river’s bed and the geological nature of the terrain, [...]
we deemed necessary to attempt using picks on the opposite bank, which was still in Austrian
hands. For this purpose, we had to cross the river with the telegraphic interception line made
of an underwater cable or to build an aerial wire line with one or more suspended spans.
By taking advantage of darkness at night, a group of brave telegraphists crossed the river in
boats protected by escort patrols and laid the copper plates on the enemy side. The operation,
despite the abundant rifle and machine guns fire, was a total success .
54
Even if such attempts were repeated frequently, the Austrians managed to discover the earth
sockets connected to temporary listening stations and to destroy them rather quickly, forcing
Italians to make new crossings in other locations along the river. A more straightforward solution
to the problem was to increase the inductive effects using large wire coils based on a technique
experimented since the early days of the conflict .
55
Guasco also recalled one of the actions carried out by the Italian Telegraph Operators, nearly at
the end of the war: “the last installation was made on the Ponte della Priula in October 1918, a
few days before our victory. Despite the difficulties in crossing the river with four intercepting
lines due to destroyed bridges, we exploited bundles of wires the bombing had not damaged to
establish a prompt Intelligence Service. We were able to intercept between 20 and 30 messages a
day in Hungarian” and to collect valuable information on the condition of the Austro-Hungarian
army as it tried a last resistance before surrendering .
56

52 Chief Inspector, STM, Relazione tecnica sul Servizio, op. cit., p.12.
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53 Headquarters, 8 Army, General Staff, Telefoni per le comunicazioni nella zona di prima linea (Telephones for communications
in front line area), no. 5803, 14 August 1918, AUSSME, Series F3, env. 147.
54 G. Guasco, Le intercettazioni, op. cit., p.249.
55 ibidem, several interceptions were carried out by induction, thanks to wire spirals whose grounding connections were not
installed on the other bank of the river.
56 ibidem, the historic Ponte della Priula, in the province of Treviso, had been destroyed during combats.

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