Page 91 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

between “douhetIsm” And “close AIr support”. the germAn AIr wAr doctrIne In world wAr II 91

6
Smuts, which addressed general questions of air war. The commission suggested
that an independent British air force be set up, and, on 18 April 1918, the Royal Air
Force was founded. However, it did not yet come into action during World War I. 7
It’s future strategic orientation was already indicated in a memorandum issued by the
Empire General Staff in January 1918. It contained the suggestion to systematically
bomb important German cities until they were completely destroyed or at least until
the morale among the workers living there was shattered. Such attacks would not
only hamper industrial production on a permanent basis, but they would also sustain-
ably undermine the public’s trust and confidence. 8
The British were already mentally oriented towards this form of bomb war due
to their traditional practice of establishing sea blockades, which had always been
directed against the entire enemy nation and not exclusively against its armed forces. 9
Furthermore, there was the however unfounded idea based on the famous remark of
Sir William Douglas, the later Lord Weir, that racially different nations were more
sensitive to bloodshed than the British and that their morale would thus break first. 10
The person who defined the British air war doctrine was Marshal of the Air Force
11
Lord Hugh Trenchard, the commander-in-chief of the new Service. He firmly be-
lieved that air raids “owing to its crushing moral effect on a Nation, may impress the
public opinion to a point of disarming the Government and thus becoming decisive”.
12 Consequently, the Royal Air Force War Manual, the British regulation on air war-
fare enacted in 1928, contained the statement that a nation’s strength of will was the
foundation for all its war efforts. After all, it was the will of the people that would
empower the government to draw on the resources required for warfare. In line with
Trenchard’s thoughts, the manual also stated that: „A Nation is defeated once the
people or the government no longer have the will to pursue its war aims“. 13
The German air war historian Horst Boog stated in this regard that these sen-
tences – as weird as it may sound - actually illustrated the democratic approach of the

6
Cf. Raymond Fredette, The First Battle of Britain 1917-1918 and the Birth of the Royal Air Force.
London 1966, p. 233.
7
Cf. Henry Albert Jones, The War in the Air. Oxford 1937, Vol. Appendices, Appendix II, p. 8-14.
8 Ibid., Appendix IV, p. 26.
9 Cf. Horst Boog, Der anglo-amerikanische strategische Luftkrieg über Europa und die deutsche
Luftverteidigung, in: Horst Boog/Werner Rahn/Reinhard Stumpf/Bernd Wegener, Der Globale
Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941-1943. Militärgeschich-
tliches Forschungsamt (ed.) (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 6). Stuttgart 1990,
p. 429.
10
Cf. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain (see Note 6), p. 225.
11
Cf. Phillip Meilinger, »Trenchard and >Morale Bombing<: The Evolution of the Royal Air Force
Doctrine before World War II«, in: Journal of Military History 60 (1996), p. 243-270.
12
Jones, The War in the Air (see Note 7), Appendix, VII, p. 33.
13
Charles Webster/Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945. Lon-
don 1961, Vol. IV, Appendix 2, p. 73.