Page 90 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

90 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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of the future would be “total wars”, i.e. wars making use of all resources of a nation.
It thus seemed only logical that not only the armed forces, but also the citizens of an
2
enemy nation would be involved in the events of the war. Hence also the destruction
of the enemy’s economy and the shattering of his civilian morale became war aims.
The use of the third dimension, the airspace, played a new and important role
in the context of “total war”. Already in year of war 1917, the British government
under Prime Minister David Lloyd George created the cabinet post of a Secretary
of State for Air, which was first occupied by Harold Sidney Harmsworth. In March
1918, Sir Henry Norman, a member of the Privy Council, pointed out to him in a
memorandum “that the air is definitely the only area where it would be possible to
conduct operations of considerably broader scale and in accordance with the new
strategic principles”. 3
In 1923, Douhet succeeded in convincing the Italian government under Benito
Mussolini to set up the “Regia Aeronautica”, an independent air force, which did,
however, not dominate over army and naval forces, as had originally been planned in
his doctrine. In Great Britain, the foundation of an air force and the development of
a strategic air war doctrine took place already prior to the end of World War I. This
was caused by the attacks of German Zeppelins and so-called “Riesenbomber” (gi-
ant Bomber) aircraft on the city of London. This was the first time large, all-metal
aircraft, that had been produced by Junkers and were referred to as “Möbelwagen”
(furniture vans) in Germany, “the “Gotha G”, with a span length of 26 meters, and
the “RVI aircraft” produced in the Zeppelin works at Staaken, with a span length of
46 meters, came into operation. A total of 619 civilians lost their lives during these
bombing raids, 1,650 were wounded and the material damage caused amounted to 3
4
million pounds. On the attackers side there were no losses caused by enemy action. 5
With the experiences made during World War II and recent wars, the effects of
those German bombs might be considered low. Nevertheless, they aroused great fear
and alarm among the people of London to be subject to aerial bombing raids. This “air
scare” – of all things the first German 1,000 kg bomb hit Chelsea Hospital – forced
the British government to set up a commission headed by General Jan Christiaan

2
Cf. Bernd Jürgen Wendt, Der »totale Krieg« der Zukunft in den Planspielen der Reichswehr, in:
Führungsdenken in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Streitkräften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.
For Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Gerhard P. Groß (ed.) (Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte,
Vol. 19). Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn 2001, p. 45-39.
3
Cited in Richard J. Overy, Luftmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg: historische Themen und Theorien, in:
Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ein internationaler Vergleich. For Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt, Horst Boog (ed.) (Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte, Vol. 12). Herford/Bonn 1993 p.
24.
4
Cf. John Terraine, Theorie und Praxis des Luftkrieges: Die Royal Air Force, in: Boog, Luftkriegführung
im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 537.
5
Cf. John H. Morrow, Die deutsche Flugzeugindustrie im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ein Ver-
gleich, in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 73.