Page 89 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

Germania

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reiner pommerin
Between “Douhetism” and “Close Air Support”

The German Air War Doctrine in World War II

I.

n 1921 the Italian Army General Giulio Douhet published the book “Il Dominio
dell’ Aria”, presenting his thoughts regarding the role of air forces in the war of
Ithe future, which he described more precisely in a new edition in 1927. In the
event of a war, he first envisioned focus attacks on the enemy’s military airfields to
be carried out by air forces equipped with heavy, long-range bombers in order to
keep enemy aircraft on the ground, thus preventing them from destroying friendly
territory. Then, further bombing raids against all military and defense-related targets
of the enemy should be continued until the enemy population’s will of resistance was
broken. Douhet requested full independence for the newly established air forces, in
practice their dominance among the Services. He accepted a reduction of the number
of army and naval forces in favor of an expansion of the air forces for the plain rea-
son that the occupation of enemy territory did not seem that important to him any
longer. Furthermore, the provision of direct support to combat operations of the oth-
er Services would unnecessarily withdraw important forces from the air force. The
term “Douhetism”, which developed after his thoughts had been published, referred
1
to the theoretical concept of an (air) warfare that was to achieve the enemy’s surren-
der not by eliminating the combat power of his forces, but by conducting bombing
raids against industry and the civilian population.
Although the idea of involving the population in war fighting might ex post be
surprising, it was closely related with the Italian officer’s horizon of experience: In
World War I, neither the major offensives of the army troops, nor the operations of
the naval forces contributed to a quick decision of the war, and even turned out to be
extremely costly in terms of human resources and materiel. Therefore, in the twen-
ties and thirties of the 20 century military strategists, like Douhet, tried to avoid
th
long wars involving heavy losses. After 1918, it was generally assumed that the wars

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Prof. (Emeritus) Dr. Reiner Pommerin joined the German Air Force in 1961 and holds the rank of
Colonel (Res). He has taught at Cologne, Mayence, Erlangen, Jena, Dresden, Harvard, Oxford and
Vanderbilt University. He is Chairman of the Advisory Board on Leadership Development and Civic
Education of the German Federal Minister of Defense, member of the Board of the International
Commission for Military History and Senator for Culture in the Senate of Culture of the State of
Saxony, member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) at London. He is Coeditor
of the Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift and author of numerous books and articles.
1
Cf. Karl Köhler, Douhet und Douhetismus, in: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 14 (1964), pp.
88-91.