Page 234 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

220 HORST BOOG

addition, undertook a war against Greece from Albania in October 1940 and thus
offered the British a chance co set foot on the European continent again, from whe-
re they had been driven off, and on the strategically importane Island of Crete in
fulfilling an earlier promise of assistance to the Greeks. Crete was about. to become
a British air base against che Rumanian oil, which was so importane for the Ger-
mans, and also a naval base in a centrai position. The first consideration was co
induce Hitler later on to take Crete rather than Malta. Anyvay the war had now
entered Southeast Europe, where Hitler had tried to maintain tranquility in order
to exploit the natural resources of oil in Rumania and bauxite and others in Yugo-
slavia and slo to shield the right flank of his intended campaign against the Soviec
Union. Not unselfishly, Hitler had to help Mussolini out of his Balkan difficulties.
Bad roads and wincer weather poscponed this assistance unti! the spring of 1941,
when also che British, having driven Marshal Graziani back to the Gulf of Sirce
by early February, stopped there co turn north for the support of their Greek ally.
The Luftwaffe's VIIIth Air Corps and 12 German Army were assembling in Ruma-
nia for Operacion "Marita" against Greece, because meanwhile che British victors
in Norch Mrica had become che main reason for the German engagement in the
Medicerranean. Before Wavell's accack of 9 December only a limited German air
support with four bomber and one aerial mine-laying groups against che British
fleet in che eastern Mediterranean plus a temporary assistance of an envisaged Ita-
lian thrusc into Egypt by Xth Air Corps had been planned willy-nillyly, because
Hitler hesitaced to interfere in an area where he did not want co. He had never
favoured a big engagement also with ground forces in the souch, although his
commander-in-chief of the navy, who wanced co bring the war co an end by hitting
the British in the Mediterranean, had repeacedly advised so. He considered this
a diversion from his own plans against Soviet Russia, for which he had vainly at-
tempted just co dose the western entrance co che Mediterranean with the help of
Spain. Now Hitler had co act immediately. An air transport group was sent co Fog-
gia co assist in che supply of che Italia n troops in Albania as of 9 December 1940,
and o ne month htter -X Air Corps bega n ics first attacks o n, the British navy from
Sicily. In early January 1941 it was even decided co deploy an at first strictly defen-
sive "blocking" -unit and some larger tactical air force detachments in North Afri-
-ca, the forrner evenmally ·developing into Rommel's ''Afrikakorps'' and the latter
into the command of the "Air Leader Africa'': What was meant to be a temporary
engagement only, soon became - also in che air - a new front which Hitler would
ha ve liked to avoid and which he now helped to establish for che safety of Germa-
ny's politica! position requiring that Turkey stayed out of, and ltaly be kept in,
che war. lnterestingly the German Navy did not engage itself in the Mediterranean
at this moment.
The question may be asked whether che axis-partners Germany and ltaly might
have had a bett.er chance co hit Britain by a concentrated operation in che centrai
Mediterranean already in the summer of 1940, when she was very weak there espe-