Page 235 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE LUFTW AFFE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 22~

cially in the air. It is, however, questionable whether the low scone walls compart-
mentalising Malta would have allowed a successful airborne landing on the island,
and an amphibious landing would have required the previous elimination of che
British fleet. The deeper reasons for remaining passive·must be looked for in Mus-
solini's belief co end the war wich Britain without much more fighting and in the
non-existence of a joint war pian of che axis partners, whose interests were diver-
ging. Hitler, after che defeat of F ra.nce an d che endurance of Britain, wanted co
establish his continental empire in che east by a supposedly shorc campaign against
the Soviec Union and regarded the area souch of the Alps as Mussolini's cheater
of war, in which he disliked to interfere. Thus che question of joint action against
Britain could not even come up, and to talk about a missed strategie chance is
co assume a higher willingness for cooperation on the pare of che two egocentric
leaders chan there had been.
Wich more justification it could be asked whether a chance to take Malta was
missed in che summer of 1941, afcer the ràcher limited German engagement had,
nevercheless, met wich great successes and decisive improvements of che axis situa-
don. In March Xth Air Corps together with che Icalian Air Force had reduced che
island as an air and naval base and impeded che British fleet in che cenerai Medi-
terranean to a degree which allowed supply convoys to reach Rommel in Norch
Africa and enable him with che support of Air Leader Africa to push back the Bri-
tish to the Egyptian border and to lay siege to che fortress of Tobruk (Annex Il).
In che Balkans the British had been driven out of Greece and Crete by the end
of May. The air-sea battle near Crete further proved chat a superior land-based
air force could, wichin a limited maritime area, dominate a strong fleet without
adequace air cover (Annex III). lt had been che first major battle of its kind in hi-
story. Three cruisers, six destroyers and five mocor torpedo boats plus some smal-
ler units had been sunk by the Luftwaffe. Three battleships, one aircraft carrier,
six cruisers and seven destroyers had been damaged from the newly gained Greek-
Cretian basis, che Dodecanese, and North Africa. The domination of the eastern
Mediterranean by the Luftwaffe and the threat against the British Alexandria fleet
now seemed possible. Furchermore the N ile-Delta and che Suez Canal·could be at-
tacked an d thus Rommel' s weak forces be relieved.
The Luftwaffe believed chat wich · but moderate forces heavy pressure could
be exerted on the already weakened enemy in the eastern Mediterranean and
cransferred Xth Fliegerkorps from Sicily to Greece. Bue Hitler refused co listen to
suggestions of Generai Lohr, commanding officer 4 Air Fleec, and of the Comman~er­
in-Chief of che German Navy, Raeder, to use the new basis fora concentrateci cam-
paign against Egypt and the Middle East. He was too preoccupied with the cam-
paign against the Soviet U nion, which was ready to be launched, and poscponed
existing other plans for a concentric attack on che British Middle East position from
Egypt and Caucasus to che time after the successful completion of che war in che
east, which he figured co last only chree co four monchs.