Page 238 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

224 HORST BOOG

increasing number of supply ships for Rommel got lost to British air and submari-
ne activities. The role of Ultra intelligence in locating axis ships was decisive.
, The loss of air contro! of the Mediterranean sea lanes was the prelude to Rom-
mel defeat at El Alamein in .late October/early November 1942. The Srukas, as-
sault planes and fighters of the tactical command of the Air Leader Africa were
now outnumbered by the RAF, which was also supplied via the Tacoradi route.
The situation was foreseeable in the summer already, and it would have been wise
for Rommel to orderly withdraw in time. But Hitler would not have allowed it,
because he was euphoric about the seemingly tangible victory in the Caucasus, from
where he, in accordance with Directive No. 32 of 11 June 1941 (which was never
signed), planned to sbatter the British Empire in its center using Rommel at El
Alamein as A "fleet in being" to hasten British collapse. "Torch .. , the Alli ed lan-
ding in Northwest Africa further aggravateci the German position in the Mediter-
ranean. The reinforcements sent to 2 Air Fleet for attacks on the invasion fleet and
for the defence of the rapidly established bridgehead Tunisia carne to late. Further-
more, although 2 Air Fleet had by now become the strongest German air fleet with
over 1500 planes - 4 Air Fleet at Stalingrad had much fewer -, it was unable
to deal decisive blows against the invasion because its bomber had to operate wi-
thout fighter cover at the fringes of their reach and against superior numbers of
Allied aircraft. In Northwest Africa alone Xllth Air Force and Eastern Air Com-
mand mustered about l 700 planes, not to speak of other Allied commands in the
Mediterranean and North Africa. Since the Luftwaffe could not equip ali fronts
sufficiently, its strength in the Mediterranean decreased steadily from now o n.
The battle for Tunisia was a battle of attrition of the opposing air forces with
a detrimental effect on the Luftwaffe, in particular its transport planes. German
air defence was broken by Allied air offence, German twin-engine bombers agai
could not interrupt Alli ed maritime supplies. The standard Me l 09 fighter was
ineffective against the US four-engine bomber and could not be supplied in greater
numbers because of the increasing needs of the air defence of Germany. This shor-
tage was also a result of earlier Luftwaffe armament policy aiming at a strong of-
fensive air force with many bombers and neglecting the fighter defences, a policy
sustained too long because of the successful offensive operations of the first years
of the war. The standard German medium bo m ber had sufficed for continental
campaigns but performed insufficiently in the air war over the sea. There were
no adequate escort fighters. The Luftwaffe was essentially a tactical air force which
had proved its superiority in the cooperation with the ground forces in the early
campaigns in centrai Europe, Russia, and North Africa. lt was bound to fail when
employed strategically. lts great losses in this p ha se of the war reduced the quality
of the crews by shortened training periods, and also their morale.
After the only chance for success in the Mediterranean had been missed in
the summer of 1941 due to its being regarded as a secondary theater of war, the
month of July 1943 marked the beginning of the final decline of the Luftwaffe