Page 239 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE LUF1W AFFE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 225

there and elsewhere. 1800 aircraft could not turn the battle of Kursk into a suc-
cess; in Hamburg German air defence was blinded by .. window" and the city deva-
stated in a sort of pre-atomic strike; Sicily was occupied by the Allies and the Luftwaffe
was driven out. Field Marshal von Richthofen, sent from Russia to the Mediterra-
nean as Goring· s most ca pable field comma n der, could no t turn che ti de any more
view of Allied air supremacy. The Luftwaffe Chief ofStaff, Colone! GeneralJeschon-
nek, drew the consequences from the hopeless over-exertion of the Luftwaffe at all
fronts and committed suicide on 18 August 1943 (Annex VII). By the end ofDe-
cember 1943 the strength of 2 Air Fleet had decreased to 288 aircraft from 1532
in November 1942, while US Xllth Air Force comprised 1244 planes already in
October 1942 and XVth Air Force roseto 1447 bombers and fighters by July 1944,
not to mention the British air forces in the Mediterranean. For Germany the Medi-
terranean theater of war had lost much of its importance. The Lufcwaffe had to
focus ics main efforts on che air defence of the Reich, the defence in Rus5ia and
che prevention of an invasion of centrai Europe, which posed more imm.inent dan-
gers. The campaign in ltaly became just a holding affair, and the decision cal~en
after the solidification of the situation in the Aegean in the fall of 1943 to deplete
che air force in the south in favour of reinforcements at the othèr places mentioned
proved righe, because Kesselring could successfully continue the holding operations
of his ground forces almost wichout any air support due to the favourable terrain
in ltaly.
Nevertheless, che steady pressure of che Alli es o n che Luftwaffe in the Medicer-
ranean and the attrition it had co suffer there greatly affected the situation of the
Lufcwaffe as a whole. Transport planes suffered under the wear and cear because
of che large distances before an d after che battle of El Alamein, when they practical-
ly had to replace the sea transport, and also under the superior Allied fighter forces
in che Battle for Tunesia. The big losses in transporc planes had a lasting negative
effect on blind-flying training, because the Ju 52 were also used for this (Annex
VIII). The drain.especially on fighters in 1943 and togecher with the bombing of
German fighter industries prevenced che builtup of a sufficient home air defence
and the warding off of the invasion in 1944. le was also in the Mediterranean chat
che Allies had made cheir first experiences with che new gliding bomb units which
enabled them to develop councer-measures in time, and where they could exercise
their amphibious landing mechods and srudy the effects of the air offensive against
transportation cargets which, when applied o n a large scale in 1944/45, was to cau-
se che collapse of the German war machine. So Allied air supremacy gained in the
Mediterranean against the sacrificial resistance of the Luftwaffe had its repercus-
sions at the other fronts, favourable for the Allies and unfavourable for the Ger-
mans. The Mediterranean cheater of che air war proved again that che loss of air
superiority and of air contro! of che sea lanes results in defeat on sea and on che
ground and that the existence or non-existence of adequate air forces is a decisive
strategie factor in war, chough not the only one.